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Ralph S. Brown*
INTRODUCTION
The dominant concern of the law protecting designs of
useful articles has been to keep design and utility separated.
The easy recognition of exclusive rights in design, especially
when that recognition flows from copyright, creates pressure
for recognition of exclusive rights in the articles to which the
design is applied, thus inhibiting imitation. Yet our system,
in the interest of enhancing competition, allows and indeed
encourages imitation, unless the imitated object is entitled
to be immunized from copying by qualifying for a copyright,
or for a patent, or for protection from competition that is
legally considered unfair.'
* Thanks to Professors Robert Denicola and Robert Gorman for help with
suggestions; special thanks to Professor Craig Joyce for a close critical reading.
Simeon E. Baldwin Professor of Law Emeritus, Yale Law School; Visiting Profes-
sor of Law, New York Law School.
1. The leading judicial authority for the assertions in this paragraph is Kel-
logg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, reh'g denied, 305 U.S. 674 (1938).
Kellogg was privileged to use both the name "Shredded Wheat," because it was
held to be generic, and the shape and appearance of the biscuits, because they
were the subject of patents that had expired and because they were functional.
"Kellogg Company was free to use the pillow-shaped form, subject only to the
obligation to identify its product lest it be mistaken for that of the plaintiff." 305
U.S. at 120. The Shredded Wheat case has slipped into undeserved obscurity, de-
spite a magisterial opinion by Justice Brandeis.
The teachings of the Shredded Wheat case were carried forward in Sears, Roe-
buck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, reh'g denied, 376 U.S. 973 (1964) and the
companion case of Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, reh 'g
denied, 377 U.S. 913 (1964), references to which will recur frequently in this
Article.
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To exemplify: Suppose that I market an orange-juice
squeezer that effectively extracts juice, and that, thanks to a
sleek design that I have made or bought, has an appearance
pleasing to buyers of squeezers. I am not likely to accept
with equanimity the display on an adjoining shelf of a
squeezer that looks like mine and works like mine, especially
if the price is lower.2 But ordinarily I would have no legal
redress against the competitor. What he is doing is the
purest form of competition, so long as he does not confuse
the public by masquerading as me. 3 As for my orange
squeezer, I cannot get a patent and thus bar the competitor,
because my squeezer, though efficient, is neither novel nor
inventive. Nor can I get a design patent-for the ornamen-
tal design of a useful object-for similar reasons: my design,
though attractive, is not distinctive enough to satisfy the Pat-
ent Office that I have made a significant advance in the art of
designing orange squeezers.
What about copyright? The competitor, we may as-
sume, has baldly copied my design; so my chance of stopping
him looks more promising. I assert that my design is a
sculptural work, entitled to copyright.
Here the dissonance between protected design and free
competition in useful articles becomes clamorous. Unlike
patent, copyright law has no requirement of novelty or
merit.4 But it tries hard to. preclude people from tying up
the usefulness of a useful object by way of preventing copy-
ing of its overall shape. Perversely, some critics might say, if
I concealed my orange squeezer inside a replica of a Mayan
pyramid, then I could have a copyright on that antifunctional
2. This example is inspired by the "Mighty OJ" litigation. See infra note 154
and accompanying text.
3. There is another form of competition where the rival tries to make his
product appear different from and better than mine, whether it really is or not.
This is what economists call "imperfect competition" or "monopolistic competi-
tion." See E. CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION (8th ed.
1962);J. ROBINSON, THE ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT COMPETITION (2d ed. 1969). It
is the primary thesis of this Article that there is no general duty to differentiate,
except to avoid confusion or deception.
4. A modicum of creativity may be required. See I M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT § 2.01[B](1986). Generally, all that a copyright claimant need show is
that she originated the work, i.e., did not herself copy it. See id. at § 2.01 [A].
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shape. 5 Or I could apply a decal of a bathing beauty to its
surface. My competitor would have to avoid the pyramid
and the picture; but that is all (and he must in every case
label his squeezer with his name or mark clearly enough to
avoid confusion).
The preceding paragraphs engrave on the head of a pin
the central elements of our law on the relationship of design
to function. Other systems exhibit deviations. For example,
in Italian law, it is said that under some circumstances, "slav-
ish imitation" is prohibited; differentiation can be
compelled .6
English law accepts the full protection of functional de-
sign by way of copyright in engineering drawings of parts of
machines. Making the three-dimensional parts without per-
mission infringes the copyrighted drawings. 7 In a great case
decided by the House of Lords in 1986, the Law Lords did
create a "spare parts exception" for car owners; they would
no longer be obliged to buy replacement exhaust pipes only
from the auto manufacturer. 8 But the underlying position,
that copyright in drawings of everything from "bolts to bed-
pans"9 creates a monopoly in objects that follow the draw-
ings, is unimpaired. Furthermore, the government intends
to perpetuate it in an impending statutory revision.'
0
Other European countries do not go as far as the British
do in barring competitors from copying useful articles. The
variations in law and practice are intriguing, but they cannot
be explored here. I t I am going to stay parochially within
our own system.
5. See Ted Arnold Ltd. v. Silvercraft Co., 259 F. Supp. 733 (S.D.N.Y. 1966)
(copyright upheld in a replica of an old-fashioned telephone with a pencil sharp-
ener inside).
6. C. FELLNER, THE FUTURE OF LEGAL PROTECTION FOR INDUSTRIAL DESIGN
157-58(1985).
7. For a thorough analysis of the English law, see C. FELLNER, supra note 6, at
chs. 1-4, 8.
8. British Leyland Motor Corp. v. Armstrong Patents Co., 2 W.L.R. 400, 1
All E.R. 850 (1986).
9. See C. FELLNER, supra note 6, at 31.
10. GREAT BRITAIN BOARD OF TRADE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INNOVA-
TION, 1986, CMND. No. 9712, at 20-21 (a "White Paper" stating that the govern-
ment's program will propose 10-year protection against copying, as to both
aesthetic and functional aspects). A similar proposal is afoot in the United States.
See infra note 271 and accompanying text.
11. See C. FELLNER, supra note 6, at ch. 6.
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Decelerating from this speedy survey, this Article will
now further develop, in Part I, the copyright position. Part
II offers a brief consideration of design patents. Part III will
criticize the rapid expansion in the last decade of protection
of the shape and appearance of goods by way of unfair com-
petition applications, notably Section 43(a) of the Lanham
Act. 12 Part IV will give attention to the other side of the de-
bate: arguments that copiers of designs should be curbed
because they are free-riders who discourage enterprise and
innovation. Part V will resurrect the case for a separate stat-
ute affording fairly extensive, but short-term, protection to
ornamental designs of useful objects.
I. COPYRIGHT IN DESIGNS ON OR OF USEFUL OBJECTS
The copyright approach to designs and useful articles
concentrates on tests for copyrightability. These have devel-
oped, as one would expect, through cases, regulations and
statutes. I will review these developments sequentially,
using as a context the views of Nimmer and other
commentators.
A. Nimmer's View
Professor Nimmer's contribution to this topic is, natu-
rally, found in a substantial section of his magisterial Trea-
tise.' Like everything he wrote, his views deserve respectful
attention, even if one emerges with some disagreement.
Nimmer was quite critical' 4 of the way the cases had gone in
the aftermath of Mazer v. Stein.' 5
When, in that 1954 case, the Supreme Court decided
that a statuette of a Balinese dancer was eligible for copy-
right, even though intended for use as a lamp base, a mild
upheaval occurred. The prevailing position until then had
been that the design of useful objects was outside the sphere
of copyright.16 The Copyright Office had yielded only so far
as to accept, by a regulation of 1949, "works of artistic
craftsmanship, insofar as their form but not their mechanical
or utilitarian aspects are concerned, such as artistic jewelry,
12. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982).
13. M. NIMMER, supra note 4, at § 2.08[B](3].
14. See id.
15. 347 U.S. 201, reh'g denied, 347 U.S. 949 (1954).
16. See H. BALL, LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY 87 (1944).
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enamels, glassware, and tapestries .... 7 The Office did
not, however, resist the longer step of Mazer v. Stein, and in-
deed encouraged it in a brief amicus curiae.'8 However, the
immediate outpouring of useful articles that claimed shelter
as copyrightable "works of art" led to second thoughts. The
regulations were buttressed in 1956 so that copyright would
be denied to an article if its "sole intrinsic function ... is its
utility."' 19 "Sole" seemed to leave the door open rather wide
to a large category of objects of mixed artistic and utilitarian
appeal. Thus, in the General Revision, further constrictions
were made in the definitions section of the statute itself.
"Useful article" became "an article having an intrinsic utili-
tarian function that is not merely to portray the appearance
of the article or to convey information." 2o That is, "an"
took the place of "sole."
That definition, which must be read in conjunction with
the definition of "useful article" just quoted, stands as
follows:
Pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works 21 include two-di-
mensional and three-dimensional works of fine, graphic,
and applied art, photographs, prints, and art reproduc-
tions, maps, globes, charts, technical drawings, diagrams,
and models. Such works shall include works of artistic
craftsmanship insofar as their form but not their mechan-
ical or utilitarian aspects are concerned; the design of a
useful article, as defined in this section, shall be consid-
ered a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work only if, and
only to the extent that, such design incorporates picto-
rial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified
separately from, and are capable of existing indepen-
dently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article. 22
Of most importance, this definition imbedded in the statute
the "separability" test first introduced to the regulation in
1959:23 that the design of a useful article, to qualify for
copyright, must be capable of separate identification and in-
dependent existence.
17. 37 C.F.R. § 202.8(a) (1949).
18. Brief for the Register of Copyrights as Amicus Curiae, Mazer v. Stein, 347
U.S. 201 passim (1954).
19. 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(c) (1956).
20. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) (emphasis added).
21. These words took the place of "works of art" in the old statute, 17
U.S.C.A § 5(g) (1909).
22. 17 U.S.C. 101 (1982).
23. 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(c) (1959).
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The leading case on separability, which incurred Nim-
mer's disapproval, was Esquire v. Ringer,24 in which the Regis-
ter of Copyrights was upheld by the District of Columbia
Circuit in denying copyright to "the overall shape or config-
uration of a utilitarian object"-an outdoor floodlight of
clean contemporary design. 25 Judge Gesell in the District
Court favored registration, in part to avoid discrimination
against abstract forms. 26 Judge Leventhal of the Court of
Appeals in his concurring opinion neatly summed up the
issue:
Form follows function, is the credo of one school of art.
Yet the overall legislative policy against monopoly for in-
dustrial design sustains the Copyright Office in its effort
to distinguish between the instances where the aesthetic
element is conceptually severable and the instances
where the aesthetic element is inextricably interwoven
with the utilitarian aspect of the article.
27
Nimmer believed that the "conceptual" separability of
the design had been neglected. He accordingly took an ap-
proving view of the next major case, Kieselstein-Cord v. Accesso-
ries by Pearl,28 in which the design of highly ornamental belt
buckles passed muster with the Copyright Office and the
Second Circuit. "This case," said Judge Oakes, "is on a ra-
zor's edge of copyright law. It involves belt buckles, utilita-
rian objects which as such are not copyrightable. But these
are not ordinary buckles; they are sculptured designs cast in
precious metals-decorative in nature and used as jewelry is,
principally for ornamentation.-
29
But in 1985 the designer lost again in Barnhart v. Econ-
omy Cover Corporation.30 Here the subject was torsos-man-
nequins in female and male form, one pair nude, the other
in blouse and shirt. The designer pointed out that she had
sculpted the originals, and that they were traditional in sub-
24. 591 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979). For Nim-
mer's position, see infra text accompanying notes 33-34.
25. 591 F.2d at 800 (illustrated in R. BROWN & R. DENICOLA, CASES ON COPY-
RIGHT 142 (4th ed. 1985)).
26. See Esquire v. Ringer, 414 F. Supp. 939, 941 (D.C. 1976). The case arose
before the General Revision, but the 1959 separability test of the regulation was
carried into the statute unchanged. See supra note 20.
27. 591 F.2d at 807.
28. 632 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1980) (illustrations at 995).
29. Id. at 990.
30. 773 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1985) (illustrations at 425-26).
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ject matter. How, she must have asked, did they differ from
the Balinese maiden in Mazer? The court (distinguishing
Kieselstein rather than Mazer) found that "the features
claimed to be aesthetic or artistic . ..are inextricably en-
twined with the utilitarian feature, the display of clothes."
3'
Judge Newman, in a powerful dissent, drew a fine line: he
would award copyright to the nude forms, reversing defend-
ant's summary judgment below, and remand for trial on the
clothed forms, to see whether they would support a concep-
tion other than simply that of a mannequin.
32
After reviewing these and other cases, Nimmer found
that lines were being drawn in an unintelligible way. It is fair
to say that, apart from the simple case of a pasted-on pat-
tern, he found the requirement of separability itself to be
incomprehensible. If you took away the utilitarian lamp base
in Mazer, you also took away the Balinese figure. Nimmer
thought that conceptual separability could be found in various
ways. If this led to copyright in a "myriad of industrial
forms," to Nimmer it was "not clear that the result is unde-
sirable." 33 Competitors could be required to design around
the protected models. "Unless and until special design leg-
islation is adopted," Nimmer concluded, "if the choice is full
copyright protection or none at all, it may be that the former
alternative is preferable." 34
Where I take major issue with the master becomes a
matter of more or less. I do not accept his intimation that
the choice is all or nothing. The statute does require lines to
be drawn. A fairly clear legislative intent was stated in the
authoritative House Report that accompanied the General
Revision:
[a]lthough the shape of an industrial product may be aes-
thetically satisfying and valuable, the Committee's inten-
tion is not to offer it copyright protection under the bill.
Unless the shape of an automobile, airplane, ladies'
dress, food processor, television set, or any other indus-
trial product contains some element that, physically or
conceptually, can be identified as separable from the util-
itarian aspects of that article, the design would not be
copyrighted under the bill. Even if the three-dimensional
31. Id. at 419.
32. Id. at 426.
33. M. NIMMER, supra note 4, § 2.08[B][3], at 2-96.5.
34. Id. at 2-96.6-2-96.7.
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design contains some such element (for example, a carv-
ing on the back of a chair or a floral relief design on silver
flatware), copyright protection would extend only to that
element, and would not cover the over-all configuration
of the utilitarian article as such. 35
Now it may seem uncultured for Congress to lay such
emphasis on applied design, rather than on integral design.
But the protection of basic form does tend to protect basic
function; and that, as is often observed, is too much to ex-
tract from a statutory monopoly that lasts, on average, sev-
enty-five years, and that is obtained with only a minimal
display of creativity or originality. The way to get protection
for the lighting fixtures in Esquire, it seems to me, was to see
if they would qualify for a design patent, which would pro-
tect that designer's visual expression of the article's func-
tion, so long as the design did not hinder others from
carrying out the same operation.
B. Denicola's View
Before summing up the scope of copyright, one should
consider another able examination of the management of
design problems by copyright, published by Professor Den-
icola in 1983.36 His analysis took account of the leading
cases through Esquire and Kieselstein. He is critical, as others
have been, of the statutory definition that requires the de-
sign of a useful article to be separately identifiable and "ca-
pable of independent existence" in order to be eligible for
copyright. For one thing, as Nimmer observed, it is hard to
apply. Sometimes the test seems to exclude more than is
probably intended. "The pattern dyed into a bolt of cloth or
painted on a china cup cannot be physically detached from
the object itself," 37 Denicola argues. But that is not the test
although it is, I grant, a familiar way of talking about it.
("Can the design be 'peeled off'?," one asks.) Surely such
35. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1976). The quoted passage
is an example of Nimmer's wry observation in the Preface to the comprehensive
1978 revision of his great treatise: "At times it almost seems that it [the House
Report] was intended to reverse the conventional canon of construction, so that
reference is to be made to the terms of the statute only when the legislative report
is ambiguous." M. NIMMER, supra note 4, at vii.
36. Denicola, Applied Art and Industrial Design: A Suggested Approach to Copyright in
Useful Articles, 67 MINN. L. REV. 707 (1983).
37. Id. at 730.
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patterns can be identified and can have an "independent
existence" on paper. As an example of under-exclusion, he
advances the cabinet for a television set, which is easily sepa-
rable from the electronic wonders inside. But Denicola is
confident that the cabinet would not support copyright. 38 I
agree, though I am not sure why. Perhaps I would say that
the cabinet is, in statutory language, "An article that is nor-
mally a part of a useful article" and accordingly "is consid-
ered a 'useful article.' "39
Denicola's dissatisfactions take diverse forms. They do
not depend on such fine points as the examples given, nor
are they limited to more substantial dissents, as from Es-
quire 's reiterated assertion that "overall shape and configura-
tion" cannot be copyrighted. He is dissatisfied with
Kieselstein for still a different reason: because it remits the
judgment of artistic worth to "consumer taste." 40 This is
not the direction of the statute. Beyond all such discom-
forts, at bottom he deplores the lack of a normative model
for separating applied art from industrial design.4 1
It is significant that Denicola, after an illuminating ex-
amination of the real-life practice of industrial design, ac-
cepts that it is highly responsive to the functions of the
article designed. He accordingly concedes that to allow a
capacious statutory monopoly, on the easy terms that copy-
right offers, would be bad policy. 4 2 He proposes to avoid
the unsatisfactory constraints that follow literal-minded ap-
plication of the statute to a completed object by directing
attention to, the process of creating the design, as a helpful
perspective from which to determine separability. He finds
it compatible with both the terms and goals of the statute if
"copyright is reserved to product features and shapes that
reflect even in their utilitarian environment the uncon-
strained aesthetic perspective of the artist." 43 One marked
advantage of such an approach would be its welcome to
copyright of abstract designs, if they flow from "the in-
dependent perspective of the artist" rather than "the more
38. Id.
39. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
40. Denicola, supra note 36, at 733-34.
41. Id. at 743.
42. Id. at 726-27.
43. Id. at 748.
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integrated approach of the designer" 44-integrated, that is,
by the industrial designer's necessary concentration on func-
tion, which includes "ease of operation, maintenance, cost
of upkeep, storage, cost of manufacturing, packing, ship-
ping, display, safety, fail-safe operations .... 45
I have no quarrel with Denicola's aspirations for the cri-
teria which should guide the Copyright Office and then the
courts in making their judgments. I do have qualms about
the practicality of the criteria. How are we to verify the im-
pulses that guided a designer's hand? Must we take her tes-
timony in every disputed case? How otherwise could we
know whether the light fixtures in Esquire had an inspiration
that was primarily artistic in intent (we are, I gather, forbid-
den to evaluate the artistic quality of the result), or whether
the designer's primary purpose was to shed better light? We
would not, I suppose, have much trouble with Kieselstein. Pa-
tently, the "Winchester" buckle is not a cost-effective way to
keep one's pants up; and the designer considers himself an
artistic jeweller.46 Uncertainty surfaced again in a case that
followed Kieselstein in time but not in result, Norris Industries v.
. T. &T. 47 In Norris, copyright was denied for plaintiff's wire
spoke design which functioned only as a wheel cover, not to
hold the wheel together. Probably the designer meant to
produce something "classy," evocative of the authentic wire
wheels that are associated with elegant cars of the 1930s. Is
the result applied art or industrial design? Was the process
artistic in intent or simply an amiable fraud, like putting a
Rolls-Royce emblem on a V-W beetle?48
One thread that connects Esquire, Kieselstein, and Norris is
that in each of these cases the outcome supports the admin-
istrative decision of the Copyright Office-to allow copy-
right in Kieselstein and to deny it in Esquire and Norris.
Barnhart, the mannequin case, breaks the thread. There the
Copyright Office accepted the mannequins as "sculpture"-
44. Id. at 747.
45. Id. at 740 (quoting R. LOEWY, INDUSTRIAL DESIGN 18 (1979)).
46. Schiro, In Pursuit of the Jewelry Lookalikes, N.Y. Times, Mar. 11, 1980, at
B15, col. 1.
47. Norris Industries v. International Telephone & Telegraph Corp., 696
F.2d 918, reh'g denied, 703 F.2d 582, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 818 (1983).
48. See Rolls-Royce Motors Ltd. v. A & A Fiberglass, Inc., 428 F. Supp. 689
(N.D. Ga. 1977) (trademark protection for Rolls' radiator grill and ornament; de-
fendant sold kits to embellish V-Ws).
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but under hurried circumstances. The plaintiff asked for ex-
pedited consideration of her belated application because she
wanted to launch the infringement action. She got it the
same day.
49
How would the Barnhart mannequins fare under the
Denicola approach? Again, it is hard to predict. Judge
Mansfield's opinion tells us that they were designed as man-
nequins and that their immediate success at a trade show
convinced the designer (in her words) "that my forms were
being purchased not only for their function but for their ar-
tistically sculptured features." 50 The critical phrase is "artis-
tically sculptured." Those are just the words that might
sway Denicola, J., to find a copyrightable creation. They did
not move a majority of the Court of Appeals. I am with the
majority. The mannequins in Barnhart-I have seen them-
are flimsy styrofoam shells. Frontal photographs create a
solid sculptural impression that is quite lacking in the ob-
jects themselves.
Denicola's valiant attempt to find a normative theory
that can operate within the constraints of the statute may
fail, in the end, because of the ambiguities of reconstructing
the designer's purpose. It seems to leave too much room
for self-serving declarations of aesthetic aims, even if such
declarations could be deflated by cross-examination or sim-
ple skepticism. 5I The larger value of his essay lies, for my
49. Barnhart Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 413 (2nd Cir.
1985).
50. Id. In Brandir Int'l, Inc. v. Cascade Pacific Lumber Co., Copyright L. Dec.
(CCH) 26,017 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), plaintiff asserted that his bicycle rack, which
defendant copied, was conceived as a piece of "minimalist sculpture." Judge
Haight said that it didn't matter; it was being sold as a bicycle rack. Barnhart con-
trolled. This, according to the court, is the configuration of the rack:
51. Professor Denicola authorized me to include two of his helpful marginal
comments on a draft version of this passage. On the practicality of applying his
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purposes, in its reasoned recognition that copyright must
keep a wall between applied art and industrial design. The
wall as it stands may be poorly built. But I do not find any-
thing in Denicola to suggest a significant shift toward or
away from copyright; he mainly aspires to make the wall less
serpentine.
C. Brown's View
My own view is that the Copyright Office has done well
in sticking closely to the basic position expressed by the
Register in a 1961 Report which launched the General Revi-
sion effort.52 The Report said:
We do not believe that it would be appropriate to extend
the copyright law to industrial designs as such. In this
area there is a delicate balance between the need for pro-
tection on the part of those who originate and invest in a
design, and the possible effect of protection, if overex-
tended, in restraining competition.
53
Accordingly, the Report (while fully accepting Mazer v. Stein)
contended that
[c]opyright would not extend to the following cases:
A copyrighted drawing of a chair, used to manufac-
ture chairs of that design;
A copyrighted scale model of an automobile, used to
manufacture automobiles of that design;
A copyrighted technical drawing showing the con-
struction of a machine, used to manufacture the machine;
A copyrighted picture of a dress, used to manufac-
ture the dress. 54
test, he wrote: "The only practical contributions (I would like to assume at least
some) may be to demonstrate that 'conceptual' separability must be recognized in
some manner, and also perhaps to undermine the too-convenient reliance upon the
'overall shape' exclusion."
Further, "The standard is indeed difficult to apply-but can one hope for a
litmus-type test by which to describe criteria described as 'conceptual?' I think,
however, that the standard need not rest so heavily upon intent and self-descrip-
tion as you imply. The form itself remains the best evidence of its dependence
upon utilitarian concerns."
52. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG., IST SESS., REPORT
OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHT ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT
LAw 13 (Comm. Print 1961).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 14. Whether a drawing or picture or model will sustain copyright in
the object that is portrayed is not the same as asking whether the object itself can
have copyright. But the point of these examples is surely to stress that even if the
drawings, etc. as such could have a copyright (and they could), the useful article
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The application of the 1976 Copyright Act has been
generally faithful to these fundamentals. A design cannot
support a statutory monopoly in the production of the useful
article that embodies the design. Mazer v. Stein and the stat-
ute allow copyright in the artistic and ornamental features of
designs; but the statute requires some level of separability.
Hard line-drawing problems result. Some recognition of
conceptual separability seems necessary to avoid confining
Mazer to only the most obvious of tacked-on, two-dimen-
sional decorations. The only legislative authority for the in-
jection of conceptual separability is its fleeting mention in
the House Report already quoted: "some element that, physi-
cally or conceptually, can be identified . . . -55 The Esquire
court was dismissive of "this isolated reference." 56 But con-
ceptual separability is now surely established as a responsi-
ble criterion. Of prime significance, in my opinion, is its
recognition in Copyright Office practice. The 1984 Com-
pendium of Copyright Office Practices 57 pays substantial at-
tention to "conceptual separability." It is defined as
"features which can be visualized on paper, for example, or
as free-standing sculpture, as another example, independent
of the shape of the useful article, i.e., the artistic features can
portrayed could not. The Copyright Act of 1976 itself is oddly timid on this point.
See 17 U.S.C. § 113(b), on "Scope of exclusive rights in pictorial, graphic, and
sculptural works":
This title does not afford, to the owner of copyright in a work
that portrays a useful article as such, any greater or lesser rights with
respect to the making, distribution, or display of the useful article so
portrayed than those afforded to such works under the law, whether
title 17 or the common law or statutes of a State, in effect on Decem-
ber 31, 1977, as held applicable and construed by a court in an ac-
tion brought under this title.
See also H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 35, at 105. The application of the con-
straining definition in § 101, has far outrun this copout. Fortunately, no one
seems to pay any attention to § 113. Why state law as of Dec. 31, 1977,,or any
other time, should measure important rights under a preemptive statute is almost
incomprehensible. Professor Reichman explains that § 113 was the result of pres-
sure on the Register during the period 1962 to 1965, from Disney and others
interested in maximizing the reach of copyright. See Reichman, Design Protection in
Domestic and Foreign Copyright Law: From the Berne Revision of 1948 to the Copyright Act
of 1976, 1983 DUKE L.J. 1143, 1207-08 [hereinafter Reichman, Domestic and
Foreign].
55. H.R. REP. No. 1476 supra note 35 2d Sess., at 55 (emphasis added).
56. Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 796, 804 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 908 (1979).
57. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS COPYRIGHT OFFICE, Preface to Compendium of
Copyright Office Practices (1984) [hereinafter COMPENDIUM].
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be imagined separately and independently from the useful
article without destroying the basic shape of the useful
article.' '58
The acceptance of "imagined separately" seems to me es-
pecially striking as an anticipation of Judge Newman's dis-
sent in Barnhart, where he defined the concept as one "that
can be entertained in the mind without simultaneously per-
ceiving the forms as mannequins at all." 59 To be sure, the
majority rejected this test as "so ethereal as to amount to a
'non-test,' " and as creating a "bottomless pit."60 But the
drafter of the Compendium has a powerful ally in Judge
Newman.
The Compendium goes on, however, to reinforce the
position that the Office took in Esquire. It rejects the ap-
proach of analogizing the general shape of a useful article to
works of modern sculpture: "the fact that a lighting fixture
might resemble abstract sculpture would not transform the
lighting fixture into a copyrightable work. '" 6 1
In addition, the main ground for the decision in Esquire
is reiterated in the paragraph on "physical separability,"
which takes as given that "the overall shape of a useful arti-
cle is not copyrightable," with the result that "the test of
physical separability is not met by the mere fact that the
housing of a useful article is detachable from the working
parts of the article." 62 So much for the television set's
cabinet.63
I have quoted parts, not all, of the relevant paragraphs
of the Compendium, but my selections are, I believe, fairly
representative of the whole. Either part or whole is of
course subject to criticism as going too far or not far enough
toward copyrightability. The Office is clearly not hostile to
conceptual separability; it indeed is placed before physical
separability in the Compendium. Disconcerting though it
may be to wind up supporting the status quo, I submit that the
58. Id. at 5.03, ch. 500, at 11.
59. Barnhart Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 425 (2d Cir. 1985).
60. Id. at 419 n.5.
61. COMPENDIUM, supra note 57, 5.05.03, ch. 500, at 12.
62. Id. at 505.04.
63. But I suppose the Mayan pyramid concealing an orange-juice squeezer
might still get by because it's so deplorably remote from the overall shape of the
article itself. Cf. Ted Arnold Ltd. v. Silvercraft Co., 259 F. Supp. 733 (S.D.N.Y.
1976).
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cases thus far and the stated positions of the Copyright Of-
fice make good sense of the statute and of the policies un-
derlying it.64
II. DESIGN PATENTS
Patents for "any new, original and ornamental design
for an article of manufacture" 65 are a venerable institution,
first available in 1842.66 They are generally compatible with
the policy considerations that undergird this survey. Of
modest duration-fourteen years67 -they defer competitive
imitation but do not preclude it. The courts appear to have
been alert to knock down claimants with design patents that
attempted to capture "primarily functional" features of the
article. 68 A recent example from the Federal Circuit re-
versed a preliminary injunction in favor of a patentee be-
64. In an overview of this sort, one must move so far so fast that it is not
possible to do justice to the complex and subtle analyses of Professor Reichman in
his two mammoth articles on design protection: Reichman, Domestic and Foreign,
supra note 54; Reichman, Design Protection After the Copyright Act of 1976. A Compara-
tive View of the Emerging Interim Models, 31 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 267 (1984) [hereinaf-
ter Reichman, Copyright Act]. Wholly apart from the intensive comparative
materials (covering the major European systems, but not Great Britain),
Reichman's account constitutes a play-by-play examination of the legislative and
judicial developments in this country. He discloses an ebb and flow of protection
over time, in response to a melange of influences and pressures, at which my stark
presentation of recent leading cases does not even hint. For one thing, the Sec-
ond Circuit cases have as backdrop the renewed willingness of that court to de-
mand, with respect to familiar artifacts, "more than trivial" creativity in order to
validate a derivative copyright. See Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d
905 (2d Cir. 1980) (Disney figures); L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486,
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 857 (1976); see also Reichman, Copyright Act, supra, at 313-20,
342-50. On the legislative side, Reichman richly develops the responses of the
Copyright Office to Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, reh'g denied, 347 U.S. 949 (1954),
aimed at keeping design protection via copyright under control until the grand
solution of the General Revision could come into place, a solution that was ex-
pected to include a design protection chapter. See infra notes 235-39; Reichman,
Domestic and Foreig-n, supra note 54, at 1174-1213. Reichman regards the failure to
achieve comprehensive short-term protection for designs of useful articles as a
"mutilation" since it left us with the separability test in § 101 but with no haven
for the designs excluded from it. Reichman, Copyright Act, supra, at 350.
65. 35 U.S.C. § 171 (1982).
66. Act of Aug. 29, 1842, ch. 263, 5 Stat. 543 (1842).
67. See 35 U.S.C. § 173 (1982).
68. Barofsky v. General Elec. Corp., 396 F.2d 340 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 1031 (1969). However, "Aesthetic functionality" does not impair design
patent protection. See infra notes 117-22 and accompanying text. Indeed, a pleas-
ing appearance is what the design patent rewards. Also, overall configuration is
patentable, so long as it is not dictated by physical function. See Mott, The Standard
of Ornamentality in the United States Design Patent Law, 61 A.B.A.J. 548, 643 (1962).
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cause the "invention"-a plastic container for a dimmer
light switch-necessarily followed the contours of the switch
that it enclosed. 69 It was "primarily functional," not "pri-
marily ornamental."
70
Finally, the award of a design patent signifies that the
Patent Office believes that the design has merit, that it is or-
namental and novel, and above all, that it represents a dis-
tinct inventive step in advance of the prior art in the
particular field and is thus, in patent lingo, non-obvious. 7'
Yet despite these seeming credentials, design patent re-
mains a Cinderella who never goes to the ball.
There are several reasons why design patents are held
in low esteem. First, the process that certifies their worth is
expensive and time-consuming. The Patent and Trademark
Office (PTO) fees come to $300. It is essential to hire a pat-
ent solicitor to draft the claims and specifications. And
when, after waiting up to two years, you get a design patent,
detect an infringer, and bring suit, seven times out of ten
your patent will be held invalid, if validity is an issue. 72 In
the three out of ten that are held valid, only half will be
found to have been infringed.7 3 That at least was the situa-
tion for the period 1964-83. Now that all patent appeals go
to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, patentees
may fare better.
69. Power Controls Corp. v. Hybrinetics, Inc., 806 F.2d 234 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
Design patents sometimes issue and are then invalidated (for want of ornamental-
ity) on articles that are concealed in use. A vivid example is a septic tank. See C &
M Fiberglass Septic Tanks, Inc. v. T & N Fiberglass Mfg. Co., 214 U.S.P.Q (BNA)
159 (D. S.C. 1981). In such cases the patentee is probably trying to capture some
functional attribute.
70. 806 F.2d at 239.
71. Non-obvious to a "designer of ordinary capability who designs articles of
the type presented in the application." In re Nalbandian, 661 F.2d 1214, 1216
(C.C.P.A. 1981). See Judge Rich's dissent, id. at 1218, arguing that patent stan-
dards are not suited to industrial designs and vigorously promoting a design pro-
tection bill. See infra notes 235-80 and accompanying text.
Reichman believes that the non-obviousness requirement could and should
have had a more relaxed application, thus validating more design patents and
making them more useful to designers. See Reichman, Domestic and Foreign, supra
note 54, at 1223-24; Reichman, Copyright Act, supra note 64, at 298-333. He per-
ceived some movement in that direction in the 1970s. See Reichman, Copyright Act,
supra note 64, at 298-333.
72. Lindgren, The Sanctity of the Design Patent: Illusion or Reality? 20 1ears of De-
sign Patent Litigation Since Compco v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., and Sears, Roebuck
& Co. v. Stiffel Co., 10 OKLA. CITY U.L. REV. 195, 261 (app. II) (1985).
73. Id.
1356 [Vol. 34:1341
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If anyone knows why so few contested design patent
cases succeed, I have not found the explanation. To be sure,
utility patents have hard going too-validity is denied in
about half the cases where it is challenged.7 4 It seems plau-
sible to surmise that weak patents are attacked. Good ones
collect royalties. Another probable reason is the often sub-
jective nature of the judgment whether the design meets the
statutory standards. The Patent Office examiners see it one
way; a trial judge another; an appellate bench another. As
the Eighth Circuit once asked, "Are six eyes better than
two?" 7 5
Still, between 4000 and 5000 design patents are issued
each year (from almost twice that many applications). 76
Somebody must think they are worth having. 77
If a statute were to be enacted giving short-term, copy-
right-like protection to designs (an old idea that this Article
will cautiously endorse), design patents might no longer be
useful. Twenty years ago a Presidential Commission on the
Patent System concluded that another form of protection
should be devised and design patents abandoned. 78
III. DESIGN PROTECTION VIA UNFAIR COMPETITION
If the flow of reported decisions is any guide to the pace
of activity in the real world, unfair competition law appears
to be overtaking both copyright and design patent as a
source of protection for designs. How can this be? Once
again: to imitate and copy another's goods is not a legal
wrong unless the victim of copying has a legal right that has
74. Patent and Trademark Office Study of Court Determinations of Validity/Invalidity,
1973-77, 455 Pat. Trademark & CopyrightJ. (BNA), at D-1 (Nov. 22, 1979); Patent
Office Study of Court Determinations of Validity/Invalidity, 1968-72, 194 Pat. Trade-
mark & CopyrightJ. (BNA), at F-I (Sept. 13, 1973).
75. Frito-Lay, Inc. v. So Good Potato Chip Co., 540 F.2d 927, 931 (8th Cir.
1976) (not a design patent case, but a pertinent observation).
76. Lindgren, supra note 72, at 205. "The Copyright Office registers
7,000-8,000 applied designs annually." The Industrial Innovation and Technology Act:
Hearing on S. 791 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks, of the Sen-
ate Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (March 26, 1987) (statement of
Ralph Oman, Register of Copyrights).
77. The subsistence of copyright is no bar to a design patent. In re Yardley,
493 F.2d 1389, 1394 (C.C.P.A. 1974). But the Copyright Office refuses registra-
tion once a design patent has issued. 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(a) (1986).
78. U.S. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE PATENT SYSTEM, Report 12-13
(1966).
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been invaded. The main sources of such a right are copy-
right and patent. But a seller also has a right against com-
petitors who create a likelihood of confusion by making their
goods appear to be those of the first seller. This is the beat-
ing heart of unfair competition.
The classic way of passing off one's goods as those of
another is to use a distinctive trademark, name, or symbol
that is confusingly like the other's. Confusion can also be
created by excessive similarity in what is variously called
"trade dress," "dress of goods," or, in England, "get-up."
These terms usually refer to packaging and labelling devices.
But in recent years unfair competition law has made the leap
from packaging to the configuration and design of what is
being sold. Configuration (which is like "overall shape" in
copyright discourse) and design (which is at once our ge-
neric term and also denotes ornamentation) have to be dis-
tinctive of a particular source to be considered for
protection. Similarity in appearance by itself is not enough.
Configuration and design must come to be recognized as a
badge of a seller. Before they can be protected they must
ordinarily acquire what the law calls "secondary meaning,"
which is a "connection in the consumer's mind between the
mark and the product's producer, whether that producer is
known or unknown."-79 Furthermore, when protection is
sought for trade dress, or beyond that for the appearance of
the article itself, we have to separate the "non-functional"
aspects of the dress or design from the "functional" ones.
Functional features cannot qualify as trademarks.
All this is elementary unfair competition doctrine and it
runs parallel to the copyright rules examined in Part I. The
barrier to protection of functional features in unfair compe-
tition law is akin to the ban on copyright for useful articles.
Conversely, non-functional elements of design, which can
achieve trade symbol protection, are cousins to the separa-
ble elements of design that can claim copyright.
Elemental though these trade symbol rules may be, they
are undergoing erosion. Three tendencies may account for
this. First, the favored vehicle for access to the federal courts
in the last fifteen years, Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, is
79. Ambrit, Inc., v. Kraft, Inc., 805 F.2d 974, 979 n.14 (11 th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 107 S. Ct. 1983 (1987).
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being read expansively.80 Second, some courts are very re-
laxed in perceiving secondary meaning in trade dress and
design. Indeed, the influential Second Circuit finds in New
York law no requirement of secondary meaning in such
cases, a position that I will in due course deprecate. Third,
some judges take a generous view of what design features
they will classify as "non-functional," thus making them ca-
pable of source identification and trademark status. We will
examine these developments in reverse order, commencing
with functionality.
A. Functionality
1. Supreme Court Approaches
How do we tell whether a design element is functional
or non-functional? There was a brief period when it could
be said that the Supreme Court had almost demolished the
distinction. In the twin Sears 8 1 and Compco 8 2 cases, a unani-
mous Supreme Court held that, with respect to articles un-
protected by copyright or patent, the states could not ban
copying under the guise of curbing unfair competition. All
that state law could require was adequate labelling so as to
minimize confusion of source. Furthermore, in Compco, Jus-
tice Black wrote:
That an article copied from an unpatented article
could be made in some other way, that the design is
"non-functional" and not essential to the use of either
article, that the configuration of the article copied may
have a "secondary meaning" which identifies the maker
to the trade, or that there may be "confusion" among
purchasers as to which article is which or as to who is the
maker, may be relevant evidence in applying a State's law
requiring such precautions as labeling; however, and re-
gardless of the copier's motives, neither these facts nor
any others can furnish a basis for imposing liability for or
prohibiting the actual acts of copying and selling.8 3
80. Lanham Act, ch. 540, § 43(a), 60 Stat. 427, 441 (1946)(codified at 15
U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1982)).
81. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, reh g denied, 376 U.S.
973 (1964).
82. Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, reh g denied, 377
U.S. 913 (1964).
83. Id. at 238.
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Sears and Compco, alas, have had a hard life. In Goldstein
v. California8 4 the Court held that the states could prevent
the duplication of performances on phonograph records,
thus authorizing a species of state copyright in works that
Congress had previously refused to protect. The Court in
Goldstein asserted that it was reaffirming Sears-Compco,85 which
it described as declaring a freedom to copy "mechanical
configurations which did not possess the qualities required
for the granting of a federal design or mechanical patent." '8 6
The Court went on to say that "[i]n regard to mechanical
configurations, Congress had balanced the need to en-
courage innovation and originality of invention against the
need to insure competition in the sale of identical or sub-
stantially identical products." 87 Neither the Court nor any-
one else has further clarified the meaning of "mechanical
configuration." But the phrase sounds rather like the shape
of a useful object, does it not? If the Court was limiting the
full reach of Sears-Compco 88 in order to validate its blessing of
state intervention against record piracy, what it preserved is
at the very core of this inquiry-whether and when the con-
figuration of useful objects is open to copying. In Sears, pole
lamps, and in Compco, certain fluorescent lighting fixtures,
were made free as the air to copiers, so long as the copiers
did not deceive customers about whose goods they were
getting.
Meanwhile, the Court's attempt in Compco to do away
with the endless fuss about what was functional in a design
was curtly dismissed as dictum by the Eighth Circuit in
TESCO.89 That court then galloped off, as though Compco
had never happened, and found that the profile of a hopper
truck for transporting grain was not functional, that to buy-
84. 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
85. Id. at 571.
86. Id. at 569.
87. Id.
88. The Sears-Compco indulgence of copying had been extended to titles, Tom-
lin v. Walt Disney Productions, 18 Cal. App. 3d 226, 96 Cal. Rptr. 118 (1971); a
vocalist's style, Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711 (9th Cir.
1970), cert. denied 402 U.S. 906 (1971); and an entertainer's characteristics, Colum-
bia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. DeCosta, 377 F.2d 315 (1st Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 1007 (1967), modified, DeCosta v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.,
520 F.2d 499 (1st Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1073 (1976).
89. Truck Equipment Service Co. (TESCO) v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d
1210, 1214 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 861 (1976).
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ers of such trucks the shape signified the plaintiff as source,
and that such buyers might buy a costly truck from Fruehauf,
the giant imitator, when they meant to buy from the little
plaintiff-a likely story! At least the little fellow was trium-
phant.90 But for the first time after Sears, the shape of the
article itself was protected, as distinct from its "dress."
After TESCO, the federal courts resumed fussing about
functionality with renewed zest. 9' The more functionality
could be circumscribed, the more design features would be
non-functional and protectable. One narrow definition
emerged from the tangle of litigation aimed at the unauthor-
ized substitution by pharmacists of generic pills for more ex-
pensive brand-name remedies. The question was, could the
makers of generic pills be forbidden to imitate the colors of
the brand-name products? The generic people said that
color was functional. Consumers of the pills, assumed to be
elderly and set in their ways, would not accept the generic
pills, even when they were what the doctor ordered, if they
did not bear the familiar colors of brand-name products.
Outcomes were mixed in the lower courts; the Supreme
Court considered but did not resolve the matter in Inwood
Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc. 92 But its intervention
90. TESCO anticipates the "reverse confusion" found in Big 0 Tire Dealers,
Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 561 F.2d 1365 (10th Cir. 1977), cert. dis-
missed, 434 U.S. 1052 (1978), where plaintiff, a small tire distributor, was over-
whelmed by Goodyear's heavily promoted appropriation of its "Bigfoot"
trademark to the extent that plaintiff was thought to be the copier. The TESCO
opinion asserts a misappropriation rationale as well as passing off. 536 F.2d at
1220. On remand, the trial court, while awarding TESCO 20% of Fruehauf's
profits from the copies in TESCO's sales area, allowed Fruehauf to continue to
use the disputed profile! Comment, Product Simulation in the Eighth Circuit, 57 NEB.
L. REV. 91, 139 (1978).
9 1. See Note, The Problem of Functional Features: Trade Dress Infringement Under
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 77 (1982). The author of the
Note, now Professor Litman, organizes the cases effectively. She correctly empha-
sizes the importance of establishing secondary meaning, as anterior to the consid-
eration of functionality. But then, if I read her right, she subordinates
functionality to confusion. If there is a likelihood of confusion, even functional
features can be protected. That is not the way I read Sears-Compco (which she does
take seriously, unlike many judges nowadays). She also makes no marked distinc-
tion between dress of goods (packaging and display) and the configuration of the
useful article, a distinction which I regard as vital. On the other hand, she is alert
to the possibilities of remedies less severe than a flat proscription of copying.
92. 456 U.S. 844 (1982). I take this opportunity to correct an egregious error
in Brown, Copyright and Its Upstart Cousins: Privacy, Publicity, Unfair Competition: The
Sixteenth Donald C. Brace Memorial Lecture, 33 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 301, 313 (1986),
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did provide the occasion for a tight definition of functional-
ity. A footnote to the Court's opinion says: "In general
terms, a product feature is functional if it is essential to the
use or purpose of the article or if it affects the cost or quality
of the article." 93 My unease with this definition centers on
the word "essential." Of course an essential feature is func-
tional. But any implication that only essential features are
functional is misleading, and indeed is undercut by the rest
of the definition; a feature is functional if it "affects the cost
or quality." That part of the formulation is also, in my view,
too narrow. Justice White was closer to an acceptable short-
hand when, in a concurring opinion, he quoted approvingly
from the Court of Appeals: "A functional characteristic is 'an
important ingredient in the commercial success of the prod-
uct,' and, after expiration of a patent, it is no more the prop-
erty of the originator than the product itself.
Reproduction of a functional attribute is legitimate competi-
tive activity."
94
It is not necessary for an expired patent to be part of the
scenario. Sears and Compco clearly teach that the non-exist-
ence or invalidity of a patent leave the same freedom to
copy. But neither case was cited at all.
9 5
The Court's dictum in Inwood Laboratories96 is one of
several competing views of the meaning of functionality. A
complete canvass would take one through most of the circuit
courts of appeal. At the risk of incompleteness, I will focus
selectively on recent decisions from the Second, Third, Sev-
enth, Ninth, and Federal Circuits.
where I misattributed the Court's dictum to Justice White, who took a different
view. See infra note 94 and accompanying text.
93. 456 U.S. at 850 n.10.
94. Id. at 863 (citation omitted). The language that Justice White quoted
from Ives Laboratories v. Darby Drug Co., 601 F.2d 631, 643 (2d Cir. 1979), was
itself part of a quotation from Pagliero v. Wallace China Co., 198 F.2d 339, 343
(9th Cir. 1952).
95. See Germain, The Supreme Court's Opinion in the Inwood Case: Declination of
Duty, 70 Ky. LJ. 731 (1982) (criticizing the Court on this and other grounds).
96. The only issue that the Court decided in Inwood was that the Second Cir-
cuit had misapplied the "clearly erroneous" test in reversing the District Court.
456 U.S. at 858.
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2. Second Circuit Approach
As I write, the controlling Second Circuit precedent is
LeSportsac, Inc. v. K-Mart Corp. 97 There the plaintiff pro-
duced a successful line of lightweight luggage. Defendant,
said: the court, "apparently admits" copying the general
getup of the bags, which are "made of parachute nylon and
trimmed in cotton carpet tape with matching cotton-web-
bing straps. The zippers used to open and close the bags
are color coordinated with the bags themselves, and usually
are pulled with hollow rectangular metal sliders."98 While
there were repetitive logos on both parties' bags, alike in
their overall appearance, different names were used. Plain-
tiff used the name "Sportsac," while defendant's logo read
"di paris sac." The court quickly declared that the "design
of [a] product itself may function as its packaging, serving to
distinguish it from other products, and hence be protectable
trade dress under § 43(a)." 99 This step the Circuit had al-
ready taken in two other cases, one involving toy cars, the
other paperback book covers on competing lines of
"romances." 100
The court in LeSportsac endorsed the Inwood dictum, as it
had earlier done in the toy car case, where Judge Oakes ex-
plained that a "design feature 'affecting the cost or quality of
an article' is one that permits the article to be manufactured
at a lower cost ... or one which constitutes an improvement
97. 754 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1985).
98. Id. at 74.
99. Id. at 75.
100. See Warner Bros. v. Gay Toys, 658 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1981); Harlequin En-
terprises Ltd. v. Gulf& Western Corp., 644 F.2d 946 (2d Cir. 1981). Since lug-
gage is usually displayed and sold without any packaging, the court in LeSportsac
was doubtless correct in assimilating the design of the product itself to its trade
dress. The same was true in the paperback case. Would not the toy car be sold in
a box, even though it would be displayed bare? The Sears-Compco emphasis on
adequate labelling as an adequate remedy against confusion got some attention in
LeSportsac, although without any citation of those cases. K-Mart sought to have the
preliminary injunction modified to permit it to sell its stock (90,000) of its "di
paris" bags with a prominent hang tag showing K-Mart as the source. The court
said that the tags were too easily removable, and that the equities would have
been different "had K-Mart placed the proposed tags on the bags when they were
first offered for sale." LeSportsac, 754 F.2d at 80.
Cf. LeSportsac, Inc. v. Dockside Research Inc., 478 F. Supp. 602 (S.D.N.Y.
1979) where, with copious quotation from Sears-Compco, the court denied a prelim-
inary injunction against an imitator of the same bags who (1) did not imitate
LeSportsac's logo; (2) had its own sewn-in label; and (3) used hang tags.
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in the operation of the goods."'' t The trial court in LeSport-
sac found the overall design non-functional; K Mart could
easily have altered its elements, without increasing its costs.
K Mart had argued that the design was still functional be-
cause it was "an important ingredient in the commercial suc-
cess of the product"-the same formulation that Justice
White quoted; another panel had recently used that test to
deny relief in a case involving the appearance of sofas. 0 2
But that case had also found that the sofa cushions fit to-
gether better because of the design, so that there was au-
thentic mechanical functionality in the design.10 3
LeSportsac thus distinguished the sofa case 0 4 and repu-
diated the "commercial success" test-but not entirely. The
court adverted to the possibility that "aesthetic appeal"
might be an "essential feature" of the design. If it was, still
another kind of functionality would be present and if the
case went to trial (as is typical in this field, the present ap-
peal was from the grant of a preliminary injunction), the
factfinder would have to answer this question:
Are consumers likely to purchase a LeSportsac bag
rather than that of a competitor principally because they
find LeSportsac's particular combination of design fea-
tures aesthetically pleasing, or will they buy principally
because the product features serve to identify or distin-
guish the goods as genuine LeSportsac products? If the
latter, the LeSportsac look primarily serves a legitimate
trademark purpose-identifying the source of the prod-
uct-and should be eligible for protection even though it
is also an important ingredient in the product's commer-
cial success. '0 5
101. Warner Bros. v. Gay Toys, 724 F.2d 327, 331 (2d Cir. 1983)(citations
omitted).
102. See Industria Arredamenti Fratelli Saporiti v. Charles Craig, Ltd., 725 F.2d
18 (2d Cir. 1984).
103. Id. at 20.
104. 754 F.2d at 77.
105. Id. at 78 (citations omitted). Cf. Industria Arredamenti, supra note 102,
where the court said:
[T]he overall design which Craig has copied . . . makes the sofa at-
tractive to buyers despite enormously expensive price tags .... Our
patent laws provide limited protection for new and useful inven-
tions, but, beyond the protection of the patent laws, the general pol-
icy of our law is to favor competition. Early comers may not exclude
latecomers. One may not welcome new competition, but one may
not legally complain of it. There is a minute exception, of course,
for one may not appropriate another's trademark. That exception,
1364 [Vol. 34:1341
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A very recent case in the Second Circuit merits mention.
In Stormy Clime, Ltd. v. Progroup, Inc. ,106 a preliminary injunc-
tion was vacated because, Judge Newman wrote, the trial
court did not give sufficient weight to functional aspects of
the raincoats in dispute, nor to the defendant's clear identifi-
cation of itself. In contrast, the plaintiff's raincoat "conspic-
uously avoid[ed] distinctive external markings other than its
shingled look." 0
7
On the one hand, the court, endorsing the Inwood dic-
tum, followed LeSportsac rather than Charles Craig. On the
other hand, Judge Newman, with a bow to Sears-Compco, ob-
served that unlimited trademark protection could "under-
mine the objectives of the patent laws."108
3. Seventh Circuit Approach
The competing roles of appearance as function and ap-
pearance as identification are of central contentious impor-
tance. In the Seventh Circuit, Judge Posner recently turned
his formidable powers to the functionality problem. In Rog-
ers v. Keene,' 09 the question was whether the shape of plastic
stacking letter trays could serve as a trademark. The ends of
the trays had this profile:C J
which the court describes as "hexagonal." Rogers had made
them since 1969; they were popular enough, in competition
with stodgy rectangular trays, to sell a million a year. Rogers
never sought a design patent; and did not even give the trays
a trade name until Keene, who had been a sales representa-
however, tends to enhance competition and to keep it fair. The new-
comer may produce and sell identical goods, so long as he does not
use another's figurative label. The design of the sofa here is notjust
a label; it is a principal characteristic of the sofa.
725 F.2d at 20.
106. 809 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1987).
107. Id. at 979 n.i.
108. Id. at 977-78.
109. W.T. Rogers Co. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334 (7th Cir. 1985).
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tive for Rogers, copied the Rogers tray and became a rival.
Rogers brought a § 43(a) action, had a jury trial, and came
to grief because the jury answered "no" to a special verdict
question that asked if the end panels were non-functional.
Judge Posner found that the instructions to the jury
were defective, as were those proposed by the plaintiff. In
the course of correcting the errors, he made a most acute
analysis of the relevance of attractive appearance to func-
tionality. He found a close enough connection so that he
could intone at one point, "Beauty is function." 0 More
precisely, he wrote (I cannot effectively condense this sub-
stantial passage):
To summarize our earlier discussion of functionality, the
jury has to determine whether the feature for which
trademark protection is sought is something that other
producers of the product in question would have to have
as part of the product in order to be able to compete ef-
fectively in the market-in other words, in order to give
consumers the benefits of a competitive market-or
whether it is the kind of merely incidental feature which
gives the brand some individual distinction but which
producers of competing brands can readily do without.
A feature can be functional not only because it helps the
product achieve the objective for which the product
would be valued by a person indifferent to matters of
taste, charm, elegance, and beauty, but also because it
makes the product more pleasing to people not indiffer-
ent to such things. But the fact that people like the fea-
ture does not by itself prevent the manufacturer from
being able to use it as his trademark. He is prevented
only if the feature is functional, as defined above, that is,
only if without it other producers of the product could
not compete effectively. If it is nonfunctional, it can be
trademarked even though it is pleasing.'''
On the one hand, the design feature is functional if a
rival needs it in order to "compete effectively." On the
other, it is non-functional if it is "merely incidental" and
"gives the brand some individual distinction . . . which pro-
ducers of competing brands can readily do without." It
seems to me that there is a considerable undistributed mid-
dle between these two statements. This passage was sup-
posed to guide the trial judge in framing "a proper
110. Id. at 343.
111. Id. at 346.
1366 [Vol. 34:1341
HeinOnline -- 34 UCLA L. Rev. 1366 1986-1987
DESIGN PROTECTION
instruction." It would be that judge's job "to put our
thoughts into words that will communicate effectively to lay
persons."1 2 If I were ajuror who had heard a paraphrase of
the quoted passage, I would agree with Judge Posner's ob-
servation earlier in the opinion that "[O]ur legal system
often gives the very difficult cases to juries to decide."'"13 It
is in a way comforting to know that the new trial never oc-
curred. The importance of the opinion for my thesis (even if
the critical test as set forth is imprecise) lies in its recogni-
tion that appearance can indeed be functional.14 And the
concluding sentence of the opinion conveys a powerful
message:
What Rogers may fear of course is not the loss of an iden-
tifying mark but the loss of a competitive advantage stem-
ming from the exclusive possession of a popular design;
but to protect the intellectual property that consists not
of an identifying mark but of a pleasing design a manu-
facturer must seek the aid of the design-patent law, with
its stringent requirements and its 14-year limitation, and
not the aid of the trademark laws." 15
If Rogers had been able to get a design patent in 1969, it
would have expired in 1983-the same year that Keene cop-
ied the tray." 6
4. Ninth Circuit Approach
The Ninth Circuit is the home ground of "aesthetic"
functionality; and the influential source, from 1952, is Pag-
liero v. Wallace China Co." 7 Wallace tried to prevent a com-
petitor from copying four designs for hotel china. The
112. Id.
113. Id. at 340.
114. In an otherwise thorough review of the recent precedents, Judge Posner
cited neither the Inwood dictum nor Sears-Compco.
115. W.T. Rogers Co. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334, 348 (7th Cir. 1985).
116. In Vaughan Mfg. Co. v. Brikam Int'l, 814 F.2d 346 (7th Cir. 1987), de-
fendant copied every detail of the appearance of plaintiff's folding picnic table. In
holding the copied features non-functional, the court quoted Rogers but followed
LeSportsac, Inc. v. K-Mart Corp., 754 F.2d 71 (2nd Cir. 1985). The opinion is flawed
in three respects: It made (1) no reference to the fact that a utility patent on the
table had expired in 1950; (2) no reference to Sears-Compco; and (3) no finding of
likelihood of confusion (defendant's table bore a different name). The trial
court's decision, 228 U.S.P.Q 456 (N.D. Ill. 1985), aff'd, 814 F.2d 346 (7th Cir.
1987), took account of all these elements; and the injunction forbade copying only
of the details of color and fittings that were specified as arbitrary and non-
functional.
117. 198 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1952).
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court, anticipating Sears-Compco, held that even if Wallace
could show secondary meaning:
If the particular feature is an important ingredient in the
commercial success of the product, the interest in free
competition permits its imitation in the absence of a pat-
ent or copyright .... [F]rom the standpoint of the pur-
chaser, china satisfies a demand for the aesthetic as well
as for the utilitarian . . . . It seems clear that these de-
signs are not merely indicia of source.
1 18
After Mazer v. Stein, designs like Wallace's would clearly
be eligible for copyright; but that does not affect the Cir-
cuit's position in unfair competition that appearance may be
functional and imitable. The defendant tried to push that
position much too far in the Vuitton case. 19 Vuitton imprints
its famous registered trademark all over the surface of its
prestigious luggage. The defendant persuaded a trial judge
that the Vuitton trademark was invalid (for a silly reason) 120
and that the defendant was free to sell indistinguishable rep-
licas of the luggage. All this got short shrift on appeal. The
Vuitton mark, the court held, is valid and is a powerful
source indicator: "The policy expressed in Pagliero and the
cases decided under it is aimed at avoiding the use of a
trademark to monopolize a design feature which, in itself
and apart from its identification of source, improves the use-
fulness or appeal of the object it adorns."' 2 1 This and other
cases 22 establish that the Pagliero teaching is alive and well
in the Ninth Circuit.
118. Id. at 343-44.
119. Vuitton et Fils S.A. v.J. Young Enter., 644 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1981).
120. Defendant argued that the Vuitton fleur-de-lis had been the symbol of
French royalty and was accordingly a "national insignia," in which trademark is
barred by 15 U.S.C. § 1052(b).
121. 644F.2dat 774.
122. In Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Doc's B.R. Others, Inc., 826 F.2d 837 (9th Cir.
1987), the court remarked that "This case expands the boundaries of trade dress
infringement .... [A] restaurant's decor, menu, layout and style of service may
acquire the source distinguishing aspects of protectable trade dress such that their
imitation is likely to cause consumer confusion." Id. at 841. See Unital, Ltd. v.
Sleepco Mfg., 627 F. Supp. 285 (W.D. Wash. 1985); Famolare, Inc. v. Melville
Corp., 472 F. Supp. 738 (D. Haw. 1979), aff'd men., 652 F.2d 62 (9th Cir. 1981).
Accord Fabrica, Inc. v. El Dorado Corp., 697 F.2d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 1983); cf.
Audio Fidelity v. High Fidelity Recordings, 283 F.2d 551 (9th Cir. 1960) ("aes-
thetic functionality" copying privilege doesn't apply to packaging, only to the
product itself). But see First Brands Corp. v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 809 F.2d 1378,
1382 n.3 (9th Cir. 1987) (dictum that " 'aesthetic' functionality test has been lim-
ited, Vuitton, 644 F.2d at 773, if not rejected, Fabrica, 697 F.2d at 895 .... )
1368 [Vol. 34:1341
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5. Federal Circuit Approach
The Federal Circuit reaches the functionality issue in
appeals from a denial of registration of a trademark by the
Patent and Trademark Office. 123 Both in its current and pre-
vious incarnation, as the Court of Customs and Patent Ap-
peals, the court has occasion to consider denials that are
based on functionality grounds. In what was apparently in-
tended as a major statement by the court's doyen, Judge
Giles Rich, he said that the "public policy involved in this
area of the law is not the right to slavishly copy articles which
are not protected by patent or copyright, but the need to copy
those articles, which is more properly termed the right to
compete effectively."' 24 The court rather unreasonably puts
the burden on the PTO to show that competitors do not need
to copy the configuration to compete effectively.' 25 Only
rarely does the Federal Court discuss the Sears-Compco privi-
lege to copy. 1
2 6
In actual consequence, the Federal Circuit and the PTO
have been reasonably cautious about allowing trademarks to
be registered for configurations, either of a container 2 7 or
123. 2 J.T. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS & UNFAIR COMPETITION 9 (2d ed. 1984).
124. In re Morton-Norwich Products, Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1339 (C.C.P.A.
1982) (emphasis in original). This case builds on In re Deister Concentrator Co.,
289 F.2d 496 (C.C.P.A. 1961) (also by Judge Rich; functionality found in the
shape of a table for cleaning coal).
125. See Oddi, The Functions of "Functionality" in Trademark Law, 22 Hous. L.
REV. 925, 943-49 (1985).
126. But see Litton Systems v. Whirlpool Corp., 728 F.2d 1423, 1448 (Fed. Cir.
1984). Consideration of these problems in the Federal Circuit is obscured by a
regrettable bit ofjargon. The court insists on talking about "de facto functional-
ity" and "de jure functionality," defined in the leading Morton-Norwich case as
follows:
[I]f the designation "functional" is to be utilized to denote the legal
consequence, we must speak in terms of de facto functionality and
dejure functionality, the former being the use of "functional" in the
lay sense, indicating that although the design of a product, a
container, or a feature of either is directed to performance of a func-
tion, it may be legally recognized as an indication of source. Dejure
functionality, of course, would be used to indicate the opposite-
such a design may not be protected as a trademark.
671 F.2d at 1337 (emphasis in original). I, for one, find these labels unhelpful and
confusing. I earnestly hope that they gain no wider currency.
127. The Haig & Haig Pinch bottle was the first container shape to achieve
registration on the Principal Register. Exparte Haig & Haig, Ltd., 118 U.S.P.Q
229 (BNA) (Comm'r Pat. 1958). For other examples see I J.T. MCCARTHY,
TRADEMARKS & UNFAIR COMPETITION, supra note 123, § 7.31 and § 7.34 (build-
ings). The House of Lords recently emphatically refused registration of the Coca-
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of the useful article itself.' 28 Parsimony of this sort is appro-
priate, for registration carries with it a significant bundle of
rights. 12
9
Professor Oddi, in a useful recent examination of the
CCPA and Federal Circuit decisions, concludes that the
court has little use for aesthetic functionality, however de-
scribed. 30 He points chiefly to the DC Comics case, which al-
lowed the registration of drawings of Superman and Batman
as trademarks for dolls representing the same well-known
figures.' 3 This is surely tantamount to saying that the
figures are trademarks of themselves. The function of a Su-
perman doll is to be a Superman doll. Its only utility is as a
Superman doll. For the present, an unauthorized Superman
doll probably infringes the copyright in the character Super-
man.' 32 Copyrights eventually expire. What the court has
done in DC Comics, since trademarks can last forever, is to
safeguard Superman from ever facing the rough-and-tumble
of the public domain, which might undo even Superman.
33
The Federal Circuit occasionally confronts unfair com-
petition issues in patent appeals from the district courts to
which Section 43(a) claims are pendent. In these cases, if it
denies the patent claim, it defers to the unfair competition
Cola bottle shape as a trademark. In re Coca-Cola Co., 1 W.L.R. 695 (1986). It
was admitted to the Register here in 1960. See MCCARTHY, supra, at 263.
128. The configuration of a candy bar was admitted to the Supplemental Regis-
ter. In re Bachman Chocolate Mfg., 153 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 753 (1967). See Note,
Trademark Protection of Objects and Configurations: A Critical Analysis, 59 MINN. L. REV.
541 (1975).
129. If on the Principal Register, that is. See 2J.T. MCCARTHY, supra note 123,
at § 19.5. Admission to the Supplemental Register signifies very little, except as
an aid to registration abroad. It confers no substantive rights. Id. at § 19.8.
130. Oddi, supra note 125, at 952.
131. In re DC Comics, 689 F.2d 1042 (C.C.P.A. 1982). The three opinions in
this case (two concurring, by judges Rich and Nies) further snarl a tangle of issues
about descriptiveness and functionality. The TTAB thought that the marks were
necessarily descriptive of what they portrayed and incapable of serving as trade-
marks. The court found them capable of serving as trademarks. Judge Nies
thought that if they were descriptive, secondary meaning must be shown. But she
joined in reversing the Board because it had precluded trademark capacity. The
Board also considered the drawings "commercially functional"-in the Pagliero
sense of being "an important ingredient in the commercial success of the prod-
uct." Judge Baldwin, for the court, and Judge Rich firmly rejected any such
approach.
132. Cf. Detective Comics v. Bruns Publications, Ill F.2d 432 (2d Cir. 1940)
(comic book character found to infringe Superman trademark).
133. Judge Nies, to her credit, recognized this problem but said it "must await
resolution in an appropriate case." DC Comics, 689 F.2d at 1052-53 n.6.
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law of the circuit from which the case came. It has accord-
ingly respected the Ninth Circuit privilege to copy design
appearance features, while at the same time unnecessarily
denigrating the Ninth Circuit cases as "unclear."'
' 3 4
Another Federal Circuit case from the Eighth Circuit is
truly noteworthy. Litton complained that the appearance of
its microwave ovens was unfairly copied by Whirlpool. The
court found a design patent valid but not infringed and,
through Judge Nichols, actually applied the teachings of
Sears-Compco. He correctly observed that, "No Supreme
Court case ... limits the effect of the Sears-Compco doctrine
with respect to factual situations similar to those at issue in
the Sears and Compco cases."'1 35 Even if Litton could establish
likelihood of confusion, all that state law could require was
adequate labelling; and Whirlpool had conspicuously dis-
played its name on its oven.1
3 6
6. Third Circuit Approach
I end this tour by returning to the Third Circuit. A very
recent case there reinforces the proposition that aspects of
appearance of goods can be functional and are then incapa-
ble of appropriation.13 7 Plaintiffs, through a joint venture,
are the originators of the "Care Bear" family-familiar
teddy bears distinguished by "tummy graphics," such as
"two hearts touching" or a "wishing star." Plaintiffs ex-
plained in a "licensing manual" that "each Care Bear wears
a symbol on its tummy which best explains its chosen mis-
sion." The examples given are meant to convey "Romantic
Feelings" and "Wishes and Hope."'138 The district court
(correctly) "concluded that 'tummy graphics' are functional.
In essence, the district judge found that tummy graphics do
not merely make Care Bears more appealing to the eye; they
contribute to the effectiveness and performance of Care
Bears as plush toy teddy bears."'
' 3 9
134. Interpart Corp. v. Imos Italia, 777 F.2d 678, 683 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
135. Litton Systems v. Whirlpool Corp., 728 F.2d 1423, 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
136. Id. at 1446.
137. American Greetings Corp. v. Dan-Dee Imports, 807 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir.
1986).
138. Id. at 1143.
139. Id. at 1142.
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Care Bears, promoted with enormous advertising out-
lays, were an enormous success. Defendant Dan-Dee moved
in with "The Goodtime Gang" of teddy bears, also with
tummy graphics. Plaintiff got a preliminary injunction for-
bidding Dan-Dee from selling pastel-colored teddy bears
with white stomachs bearing design graphics likely to be
confused with those used by plaintiff. Defendant retreated
to a "New Goodtime Gang" composed of stuffed animals
other than bears. Plaintiff countered with Care Bear Cous-
ins, and got a broader injunction, under which Dan-Dee was
held in contempt for copying both a dog and a bear. The
trial court, finding that plaintiff's products had acquired sec-
ondary meaning, emphasized the overall similarity of the
competing products. 40
Since teddy bears are in the public domain and "tummy
graphics" are functional, it is hard to see how such an in-
junction could stand. The Court of Appeals, imposing stiff
restrictions on itself as to the scope of review of a prelimi-
nary injunction, accepted that the plaintiff was entitled to
some protection against confusion even as to functional fea-
tures, and that Dan-Dee had to try to modify its design. But,
the court concluded, "If it is not feasible for Dan-Dee to de-
sign a teddy bear with tummy graphics which creates no like-
lihood of confusion, Dan-Dee may not be prohibited from
marketing a teddy bear with tummy graphics, but it may be
required to take reasonable steps to minimize the confu-
sion."' 14 1 The obvious step would be simply to insist on
clear labelling of origin by both parties.
A much more straightforward opinion in another recent
Section 43(a) case in the Third Circuit permitted copying of
the appearance of dishtowels with a "window-pane" design
and weave that made the towels "strong, durable, and com-
patible with contemporary kitchen decor."'' 42 In a concise
opinion affirming a finding of aesthetic functionality that dis-
posed of the case, Judge Hunter concluded,
It may seem anomalous that the law will not protect the
producer of a successful product from an admitted cop-
ier. Nevertheless, the functionality doctrine protects con-
140. American Greetings Corp. v. Dan-Dee Imports, 619 F. Supp. 1204 (D.
N.J. 1985).
141. 807 F.2d at 1149.
142. Standard 'Ferry Mills v. Shen Mfg. Co., 803 F.2d 778, 781 (3d Cir. 1986).
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sumers-and producers-from the monopoly that would
result if a producer, could protect those features that, in
effect, provide the product with its essential
characteristics. 143
Doctrinally, both the Care Bear and the dishtowel cases
relied on Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Industries,"44 a Section 43(a)
case decided in 1981, in which the subject matter, outdoor
lighting features of modern design, is the same as that in the
notable copyright case of Esquire v. Ringer."45 The trial court
in Keene had required the copier, in order to avoid confusion,
to affix a metal plate reading, "Not a Product of Keene
Corporation."
In a troubled opinion by Judge Sloviter "on the scope
and meaning of the doctrine of aesthetic functionality,"'
46
the Court of Appeals refused to enjoin the copying. The
court said that it could not accept "the broad view" associ-
ated with Pagliero
which relates the doctrine to the commercial desirability
of the feature at issue without consideration of its utilita-
rian function. Such an approach provides a disincentive
for development of imaginative and attractive design.
The more appealing the design, the less protection it
would receive.
Instead, the inquiry should focus on the extent to
which the design feature is related to the utilitarian func-
tion of the product or feature. When the design itself is
not significantly related to the utilitarian function of the
product, but is merely arbitrary, then it is entitled to
protection as a design trademark if it has acquired the
distinctiveness necessary to achieve a secondary
meaning. 1
47
But, the court observed, part of the function of a wall-
mounted fixture "includes its architectural compatibility
with the structure or building on which it is mounted. Thus
its design configuration, rather than serving merely as an ar-
bitrary expression of aesthetics, is intricately related to its
function."' 48 To permit successive designers of such fix-
143. Id. at 783.
144. 653 F.2d 822 (3d Cir. 1981).
145. 591 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979).
146. 653 F.2d at 823.
147. Id. at 825.
148. Id. at 826. Cf. Ideal Toy Corp. v. Plawner Toy Mfg. Co., 685 F.2d 78 (3d
Cir. 1982) (color pattern and packaging of "Rubik's Cube" non-functional).
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tures to monopolize their designs could stifle competition.
Therefore, no injunction could issue.
The Third Circuit seems to have arrived at a workable
and sensible accommodation in the lighting fixture and
dishtowel cases. However, to suggest that a competitor
must try to design around the conventional "tummy graph-
ics" of the Care Bears surely inhibits competition. The
plaintiff's marketing device should not be immune from all
risk of confusion by those who cannot distinguish a "Care
Bear" from a "Goodtime Gang."'' 49
B. Diluting Secondary Meaning
Source identification is still the bedrock of unfair com-
petition. Most cases routinely repeat that non-functional
trade dress must acquire secondary meaning-a connection
with a source-before it can serve as a trademark. There are
three seeming encroachments on this rule, although only the
second of them is possibly lethal. First, the Second Circuit
keeps stating that New York law protects trade dress without
a showing of secondary meaning. This is not necessarily so.
Second, there is a notion at large called "secondary meaning
in the making." It should be stamped out. Third, there is a
move toward assimilating the rules for trade dress protec-
tion with those long established for words and symbols. An
"inherently distinctive" trade dress could gain the same im-
mediate protection as an arbitrary trademark. It would not
be necessary to wait for secondary meaning to ripen. There
is nothing wrong with this trend if the standards for instant
protection are kept high.
1. New York Law-No Showing of Secondary Meaning
Necessary?
The repetitive incantation by the Second Circuit that in
trade dress cases New York unfair competition law requires
no showing of secondary meaning 50 is troublesome from
149. The Fifth Circuit has taken an avowedly narrow view of functionality in a
§ 43(a) packaging case, declining to define functionality in terms of commercial
success or marketing effectiveness. Sicilia di R. Biebow & Co. v. Cox, 732 F.2d
417 (5th Cir. 1984) (appearance and configuration of squeezable bottles for
lemon juice).
150. The beginning of this assertion is probably found in Flexitized, Inc. v.
National Flexitized Corp., 335 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1964), which concerned a de-
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the outset because it creates a misfit with Section 43(a).
When, as is routinely the case, a plaintiff alleges a breach of
Section 43(a), which gets him into federal court, and then
adds a state unfair competition claim, the Second Circuit is
staunch enough in asserting that Section 43(a) requires a
showing of secondary meaning.' 51 It does not say much for
the consistency of the system if a plaintiff who cannot show
any source connection for his getup can nevertheless win
under state law because of a disembodied likelihood of
confusion.
The rationale advanced in the leading Perfect Fit case,15 2
where the plaintiff did not establish secondary meaning and
therefore was dependent on the looser New York standard,
is a plausible one: "[M]onopolization is not a problem in the
realm of trade dress, because the possible varieties of adver-
tising display and packaging are virtually endless."'' 5 3 Fair
enough, as long as the subject is "advertising display and
packaging." Endless variation is possible; and if we are truly
talking about display and packaging there is no reason why a
second comer should be free to closely copy my packaging if
mine is distinctive and if it is non-functional and if I am not
trying to appropriate descriptive or generic symbols and if
imitation makes confusion likely.
The "Mighty OJ" litigation 54 affords a cautionary ex-
ample of what happens if these relaxed ideas are extended
from trade dress to the appearance of the product itself. It is
the real life source of the hypothetical orange juice squeezer
case with which I began this essay. The plaintiff, Metro
Kane, did not give the squeezer its "high-tech" design; she
scriptive trademark, not trade dress, but was sweeping in its language and redo-
lent of misappropriation talk. The opinion also boasted a footnote with a
prematurely narrow reading of Sears-Compco. Id. at 781 n.4.
151. Vibrant Sales v. New Body Boutique, 652 F.2d 299 (2d Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 909 (1982). Accord Morex S.P.A. ,v. Design Institute America, 779
F.2d 799 (2d Cir. 1985).
152. Perfect Fit Industries v. Acme Quilting Co., 618 F.2d 950 (2d Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 832 (1982).
153. Id. at 953.
154. Metro Kane Imports v. Federated Dep't Stores, 625 F. Supp. 313
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (injunction against distributors), affd, no opinion for publication,
800 F.2d 1128 (2d Cir. 1986); Metro Kane Imports, Ltd. v. Rowoco, Inc., 595 F.
Supp. 702 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (preliminary injunction denied), vacated for reconsidera-
tion in light of LeSportsac Inc. v. K-Mart, 754 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1985), preliminary
injunction awarded, 618 F. Supp. 273 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
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imported it from Mexico as her only product. Rowoco cop-
ied it. Rowoco, we are told, makes 1800 kitchen gadgets,
55
and therefore gets more shelf space. What was worse, from
the plaintiff's point of view, was that Rowoco sold its copy
cheaper.
In a Section 43(a) case augmented by state unfair com-
petition counts, Judge Sweet, in the first round, denied a
preliminary injunction, relying chiefly on Charles Craig, the
functional sofa case. 156 The Second Circuit remanded for
reconsideration in light of LeSportsac,157 which had just come
down. Judge Sweet duly reconsidered and concluded that
the appealing design of the Mighty OJ was entirely aesthetic
and was therefore non-functional. Plaintiff made some at-
tempt to show secondary meaning; but the court said that
was unnecessary under the New York rules. Alternatively,
the plaintiff claimed secondary meaning in the making, of
which more shortly. A companion case against distributors
of the squeezers was appealed. The Court of Appeals up-
held the preliminary injunction without a publishable opin-
ion. The litigation ended there.
Professor McCarthy has shown that the supposed New
York rule dispensing with secondary meaning is kept going
chiefly through its reiteration by the Second Circuit.158 Fur-
thermore, the New York precedents antedate Sears-
Compco, 159 and should be re-examined for their fidelity to
whatever Sears-Compco now requires. But the outcome of
155. Metro Kane Imports, Ltd. v. Rowoco, Inc., 595 F. Supp. at 704.
156. Industria Arredamenti Fratelli Sapporiti v. Charles Craig, Ltd., 725 F.2d
18 (2d Cir. 1984).
157. Another case that got caught between Charles Craig, 725 F.2d 18, and
LeSportsac, 754 F.2d 71, was Morex, S.P.A. v. Design Institute America, 779 F.2d
799 (2d Cir. 1985). Design Institute's "etagere," "a shelf unit," was copied by
Morex. The trial court held that the design was functional, following Charles Craig.
The per curiam remand held that even if this finding was erroneous after LeSportsac,
a finding of no secondary meaning still disposed of the § 43(a) claim. But on the
New York unfair competition claim, a remand was necessary. Perhaps the design
wasn't functional; perhaps there was a likelihood of confusion. The trial court had
required Morex to identify itself with a hang tag and in advertising. Perhaps that
would not suffice either.
158. Moreover, "a survey of its opinions reveals a basic uncertainty and incon-
sistency .... I J.T. MCCARTHY, supra note 123, at 675. Cf 20th Century Wear,
Inc. v. Sanmark-Stardust Inc., 815 F.2d 8, 11 (2d Cir. 1987) (under New York law,
trade dress must at least be "distinctive").
159. They are marshalled in Flexitized Inc. v. National Flexitized Corp., 335
F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1964), decided only five months after Sears-Compco.
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Mighty OJ protects the design of an article from copying,
despite ample differences in the packaging of the two prod-
UCtS,1 60 and despite plaintiff's inability to establish secon-
dary meaning.
2. Secondary Meaning in the Making
As for secondary meaning in the making, it is a sole-
cism.' 6 1 If there is no association between the product and a
source, it has never been good enough to say: "I hope to
achieve secondary meaning, so protect me now."' 162 Judge
Sweet, invoking the new-fangled notion, placed it in the con-
text of "intentional, deliberate attempts to capitalize on a
distinctive product."' 63 That is indeed what Rowoco was
doing.. It is what a copier is privileged to do unless the "dis-
tinctive" or "highly distinctive"'' 64 features have created
some association with a specific source. Judge Sweet, noting
that standard ways of attempting to prove secondary mean-
ing include evidence of large advertising outlays and large
sales, observed sympathetically that "it is difficult to imagine
160. "[S]uch labelling may be ineffective when a small distinctive item is casu-
ally considered by prospective customers." Metro Kane Imports v. Federated
Dep't Stores, 625 F. Supp. 313, 318 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
161. 625 F. Supp. at 316-17, is the nearest thing to a holding based on secon-
dary meaning in the making. It collects, at 316, earlier dicta in the Southern Dis-
trict. Cf. AJ. Canfield Co. v. Concord Beverage Co., 629 F. Supp. 200 (E.D. Pa.
1985), aft'd, 808 F.2d 291 (3d Cir. 1986) (collects other dicta but refuses to rely
on secondary meaning in the making); Black & Decker Mfg. Co. v. Ever-Ready
Appliance Mfg. Co., 684 F.2d 546, 550 (8th Cir. 1982) ("We are directed to no
case which actually applies [this] theory and we decline to adopt it."). Although
the Court of Appeals' statement of April 22, 1985, affirming jurisdiction of the
District Court on the Lanham Act claim, in Metro Kane Imports, states that it "shall
not be reported, cited or otherwise used in unrelated cases," in this academic
setting I must observe that the statement did refer to "secondary meaning in the
making" as a possible basis for Lanham Act jurisdiction.
162. See 1 J.T. MCCARTHY, supra note 123, at 704.
163. 625 F. Supp. at 316. This kind of language is familiar in copying cases
where the court is moving toward relief for the seller who has been copied. A
more forceful attack hems in the copier by making deliberate copying probative of
the existence of secondary meaning: "We hold that evidence of intentional, direct
copying establishes a prima facie case of secondary meaning sufficient to shift the
burden of persuasion to the defendant on that issue." M. Kramer Mfg. Co. v.
Andrews, 783 F.2d 421, 448 (4th Cir. 1986) (trade dress of video game). The
copier is then brought to his knees by another inference, that intentional copying
establishes likelihood of confusion. Id. at 448 n.24. The coup de grace is to com-
bine these inferences; see 2J.T. MCCARTHY, supra note 123, at 688: "The problem
with this short-circuiting of the double-inference approach is that there may have
been several other motivations for defendant's imitation."
164. 625 F. Supp. at 317.
HeinOnline -- 34 UCLA L. Rev. 1377 1986-1987
UCLA LA W REVIEW
how any moderate-sized producer entering a market could
expend the substantial resources necessary to uphold a find-
ing of secondary meaning .. ."165 Even less could a small,
one-product enterprise like Metro Kane, in a narrow market,
mount a consumer survey of any consequence, as another
way of establishing secondary meaning. 66 It inescapably
does take time and money to build up recognition as the
source of a product.
The Mighty OJ litigation, with its emphasis on inten-
tional copying and secondary meaning in the making, obvi-
ated the need for time and money, and by so doing helped
the little fellow. But the goal of unfair competition law is to
check unfair competition, not to help small business. Slack
doctrine leads to the creation of monopolies, large and
small, Without the safeguards that attend the statutory mo-
nopolies of copyright and patent. The Mighty OJ could not
have qualified for a design copyright on its overall shape and
appearance. 67 It might have been novel enough to earn a
design patent. If so, that would be a legitimate route to a
monopoly limited in time, as Judge Posner suggested in the
letter-tray case.' 68 A judicially-bestowed freedom from com-
petition, unsupported by likely deception of consumers, is
not.
3. "Inherent Distinctiveness"
The third modification to the secondary meaning re-
quirement stems from a plausible move to bring trade dress
into the doctrinal mainstream of trademark law. Four cate-
gories of marks or would-be marks are conventionally identi-
fied: (1) arbitrary or fanciful marks (like "Kodak" for
cameras and "Ivory" for soap) which are immediately pro-
tectable on use; (2) marks that are suggestive of attributes or
qualities of the product (like "Coppertone" for suntan lo-
tion), which are also protected, but not so vigorously as the
first category; (3) descriptive marks, not protected until and
unless secondary meaning links the mark to the first user;
165. Metro Kane Imports, Ltd. v. Rowoco, Inc., 618 F. Supp. 273, 276
(S.D.N.Y. 1985).
1166. Id.
167. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
168. W.T. Rogers Co. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334 (7th Cir. 1985).
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and (4) generic names of the product or service, incapable of
attaining exclusive trademark significance.
The 1981 Chevron Chemical case held that trade dress-
packaging-could be distinctive enough to be treated like an
arbitrary mark.1 69 Judge Rubin, in a refreshing review of the
development of Section 43(a), analogized trade dress to ver-
bal trademarks. He reasonably concluded that: "[I]f the fea-
tures of the trade dress sought to be protected are arbitrary
and serve no function either to describe the product or assist
in its effective packaging, there is no reason to require a
plaintiff to show consumer connotations associated with
such arbitrarily selected features." 170
The Eleventh Circuit recently took a long leap forward.
In a case about the packaging of ice-cream bars, it held that
suggestive elements in the packaging, such as a polar bear
figure, could add up to something inherently distinctive as
part of an overall distinctive packaging ensemble, and that
an inquiry into secondary meaning was unnecessary.' 7'
Judge Wisdom said, "We hold that the mainly suggestive
Klondike trade dress merits at least moderate protec-
tion."' 17 2 In an alarming footnote, he added that such dress
deserved "[g]reater protection than one composed of. ge-
neric or descriptive elements."'' 73 This goes too far. Unless
the overall ensemble achieves remarkable distinction, it
seems to me beyond the limits of respectable trademark dis-
course to speak at all of protecting descriptive elements,
without going back to a requirement of secondary meaning.
And generic elements aren't protectable under any theory.
Perhaps the court's indulgence to the plaintiff in the ice-
cream bar case can be explained by the extra-judicial consid-
eration that the plaintiff, Ambrit, was a regional producer
who distributed through nationally-operating Kraft. Kraft
ditched Ambrit when it decided to market its own six-packs
of ice cream bars and then adopted packaging as close to
plaintiff's as it could get. The equities favored Ambrit..
169. Chevron Chemical Co. v. Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc., 659 F.2d
695 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1126 (1981).
170. Id. at 702.
171. Ambrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 805 F.2d 974 (11 th Cir. 1986) (Judge Wisdom
sitting by designation from the Fifth Circuit).
172. Id. at 982. Cf. Brooks Shoe Mfg. Co. v. Suave Shoe Corp., 716 F.2d 854
(11 th Cir. 1983) (no inherent distinctiveness in "V" pattern on athletic shoes).
173. 805 F.2d at 983 n.40.
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A year earlier, Judge Posner had cautiously accepted the
Chevron approach-that intrinsic distinctiveness in trade
dress would be recognized without a secondary meaning in-
quiry-in a case about an advertising display in the Yellow
Pages. 74 Despite this acceptance, the court found no such
distinctiveness on the facts. However, the Eleventh Circuit
failed even to cite Judge Posner's illuminating opinion, per-
haps because of the different subject matter of the cases.
These recent cases that attempt to recast the rationale
of trade dress recognition all concern packaging or advertis-
ing. There the development should rest. To say that the
overall design of a useful article is "inherently distinctive" of
a particular source just by examining it and perhaps dissect-
ing it, seems to me an impermissible exercise of intuitive
judging. It substitutes an impression that the design is out-
standing, or eccentric, or clever, or something, for the
proofs of association with a source, gained in the market-
place, that add up to a showing of secondary meaning. Fur-
thermore, such a short-cut subordinates the functionality
inquiry, which is indispensable in appraising a design.
4. State Law Short-Cutting of Secondary Meaning
is Preempted
The way to control all these strains that denigrate sec-
ondary meaning is to pay closer attention to the constraints
on state law that flow from Sears-Compco and to the preemp-
tive effect of Section 301 of the Copyright Act. The sup-
posed New York rule eliminating the need to show
secondary meaning in trade dress cases is especially vulnera-
ble to such analysis.
As we have already observed, when one examines the
New York precedents, 175 they antedate Sears-Compco, and
should be re-examined for their fidelity to Sears-Compco.1 7 6
What we find running through the New York and other
cases' 77 that forbid copying without adequate demonstration
174. See Blau Plumbing, Inc. v. S.O.S. Fix-It, Inc., 781 F.2d 604 (7th Cir. 1986).
175. The principal source is Santa's Workshop, Inc. v. Sterling, 2 A.D.2d 262,
153 N.Y.S.2d 839 (1956), aff'd, 3 N.Y.2d 757, 143 N.E.2d 529 (1957) (trade name
not trade dress at issue).
176. See supra notes 159-60 and accompanying text.
177. See, e.g., Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210, 1220
(8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied., 429 U.S. 861 (1976) (truck design); Flexitized, Inc. v.
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of secondary meaning and confusion of source is the ambig-
uous tort of misappropriation. Misappropriation has no pre-
cise meaning; it is broadly defined as "the unauthorized
taking of the results of another's efforts. ,"1711 Misappro-
priation gained some respectability from the famous 1918
case of International News Service v. Associated Press 179 where
INS, barred from the Western front in World War I, lifted
AP's uncopyrighted news and was enjoined from doing so.
Its legitimacy and reach have been debated ever since.1 80 I
will not here enlarge that debate. When courts condemn
misappropriation of a design, they are trying to condemn
copying. Unless the shape or appearance of the object is
protected by copyright or patent, Sears-Compco, as we have
seen, forbids the states to prevent copying; they can only act
to prevent buyers from deception as to source. 18'
In tandem with the liberating force of Sears-Compco runs
the preemptive force of the Copyright Act. The copyright
statute preempts any attempt to create by state law rights
within the general scope of copyright subject matter. 18 2 De-
sign is within the copyright subject matter of "pictorial,
graphic, and sculptural works." 1 3 Therefore, state law can-
not forbid the copying of designs.
National Flexitized Corp., 335 F.2d 774, 782 (1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 913
(1965) (descriptive mark); Dior v. Milton, 9 Misc. 2d 425, 155 N.Y.S.2d 443 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1956), aff'd, 2 A.D.2d 878, 156 N.Y.S.2d 996 (1956) (dress designs).
178. Abrams, Copyright, Misappropriation, and Preemption: Constitutional and Statu-
tory Limits of State Law Protection, 1983 Sup. CT. REV. 509, 513 (1983). For a com-
parative survey, which is vigorously critical of misappropriation relief, see P.J.
KAUFMANN, PASSING OFF AND MISAPPROPRIATION IN THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETI-
TION (1985).
179. 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
180. See Baird, Common Law Intellectual Property and the Legacy of International
News Service v. Associated Press, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 411 (1983).
181. Cf Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d
200 (2d Cir. 1979), which was almost literally a dress of goods case. Plaintiffs
successfully claimed § 43(a) trademark rights in design aspects of their uniforms,
and confusion of sponsorship through their copying in a "gross and revolting sex
film." 604 F.2d at 202. The court said that Sears-Compco did not
apply in a trademark infringement action where the plaintiff does
not assert exclusive rights to the sale of a product but merely to a
mark indicating its origin or sponsorship .... Sears-Compco did not
redefine the permissible scope of the law of trademarks insofar as it
applies to origin and sponsorship.
Id. at 204.
182. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1982).
183. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
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The syllogism is in fact not quite so simple. Statutory
preemption has another face. It does not reach activities vi-
olating rights that are not equivalent to rights conferred by
the statute. 84 There is consensus that "deceptive trade
practices such as passing off and false representations" are
not equivalent to the statutory rights to copy, perform, etc.
Accordingly, they are not preempted. 8 5 Without proof of
passing off or false representations, can a plaintiff rely on
state misappropriation law-or any state law-to enjoin one.
who deliberately copies the Mighty OJ? After some uncer-
tainty because of bizarre turns in the legislative history of
Section 301,186 courts1 8 7 are now firmly following the posi-
tion of the authoritative House Report on the general revi-
sion of the copyright law, except in its 1976 version, that
misappropriation is "nothing more than copyright protec-
tion under another name.. "188 To avoid preemption,
state law must remain anchored in deceptive trade practices.
That means, with respect to those non-functional aspects of
'design that alone are entitled to protection, likelihood of
confusion must be established either by demonstrating a
marked degree of "inherent distinctiveness," or of old-fash-
ioned secondary meaning, and further that confusion is not
dispelled by clear labelling.
Due attention to the combined preemptive reach of
Sears-Compco and of Section 310189 would go far to eliminate
184. 17 U.S.C. § 301(b) (1982).
185. M. NIMMER, supra note 4, at § 1.01[B][1] n.47. The quoted phrase is from
a catalog of non-preempted "activities" that was deleted from § 301 (b) just before
its enactment, see infra note 186; it is nevertheless recognized that passing off is
not preempted. See Warner Bros. v. American Broadcasting Co., 720 F.2d 231,
247 (2d Cir. 1983); M. NIMMER, supra note 4.
186. For a brief period during the lengthy course of the general revision
(1961-76), "misappropriation" was included in the catalog of activities that could
be non-equivalent and non-preempted. It is very likely that the last minute dele-
tion of the entire catalog was an act of overkill aimed only at excising misappropri-
ation. The best account of the whole affair, with full analysis of the cases and
context, is Abrams, supra note 178; see also Fetter, Copyright Revision and the Preemp-
tion of State "Misappropriation" Law, 25 BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'v 367 (1978).
187. Financial Information, Inc. v. Moody's Investors Service, 808 F.2d 204,
208 (2d Cir. 1986); Warner Bros. v. American Broadcasting Co., 720 F.2d 231,
247 (2d Cir. 1983).
188. H.R. REP. No. 2237, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 129 (1966). Cf H.R. REP. No.
1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 132 (1976) (" 'Misappropriation' is not necessarily sy-
nonymous with copyright infringement ... ").
189. For a bold argument that Sears-Compco has a more pervasive reach than
§ 301, so that in many cases it is unnecessary to thread the intricacies of § 301 to
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misfits between state law and Section 43(a), so long as Sec-
tion 43(a) itself follows the classic contours of unfair compe-
tition law. The next question we address is whether and why
Section 43(a) is getting out of hand.
C. The Primacy of Section 43(a)
There are three sources of law for unfair competition
relief: (1) state law, still mostly judge-made common law;
(2) the Lanham Act, creating federal rights in registered
trademarks; and (3) what we are coming to treat as though it
is the Lanham Act, Section 43(a).
Section 301(d) of the Copyright Act makes clear that
"rights or remedies under any other Federal statute" are not
limited by that Act.1 90 Accordingly, no statutory preemptive
force constrains the working of federal trademark law as it
bears on design imitation.' 9' But, as we have seen, the main
body of that law, that is, all of the Lanham Act except Sec-
tion 43(a), has shown little warmth toward trademarks for
designs of articles.
92
The action in recent years all comes from Section 43(a);
and it is painfully clear that in practice decisions applying
Section 43(a) are free of copyright limits, and luxuriate with
little constraint by Sears-Compco. We are becoming accus-
tomed to reading that Section 43(a) expansively "creates a
federal cause of action for unfair competition."'' 93 Courts
and recent commentators 94 have lost sight of Judge Rubin's
tart observation in Chevron that it was anomalous "for Con-
gress to enact an entire statute, forty-five sections in length,
to define and protect trademarks by federal law and then in a
establish preemption of misappropriation claims, consult Dabney, State Law Protec-
lion of Intellectual Creations: Privacy and Preemption, 38 SYRACUSE L. REV. 653 (1987)
(once privacy is lost by dissemination, in the absence of copyright or patent, Sears-
Compco has constitutional force).
190. 17 U.S.C. § 301(d) (1982)(emphasis added). See 1 M. NIMMER, supra note
4, at § 1.01[B][4].
191. Application of Honeywell, Inc., 497 F.2d 1344 (C.C.P.A. 1974) (no Sears-
Compco preemption of Lanham Act design protection).
192. See supra note 127.
193. American Greetings Corp. v. Dan-Dee Imports, Inc., 807 F.2d 1136, 1140
(3d Cir. 1986).
194. See, e.g., Bauer, A Federal Law of Unfair Competition: What Should Be the Reach
of Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 31 UCLA L. REv. 671 (1984).
1987] 1383
HeinOnline -- 34 UCLA L. Rev. 1383 1986-1987
UCLA LA W REVIEW
passing reference to enact as federal the entire common law
of unregistered marks and unfair competition."'19 5
Indeed, if we take a fresh look at the language of Sec-
tion 43(a), it is remarkable that it can sustain its proliferation
of application. What it makes actionable are: "a false
designation of origin, or any false description or representa-
tion, including words or other symbols tending falsely to de-
scribe or represent the same." That is all. We accept as old
hat that until 1963 "false designation of origin" meant only
geographical origin;1 96 and that "false description or repre-
sentation" initially curbed only false advertising. 197 It is now
commonplace that these phrases have come to encompass
much of common-law trademark law.1 98
Still, the key word is "false." A designation, descrip-
tion, or representation is not actionable unless it is false. In
the area of design protection, where is the falsehood if I
copy the shape, appearance, or ornamentation of an article
that is already on the market? If I falsely advertise or sug-
gest that I designed the article myself, that is an easy case; it
does not bulk large in the law reports. 199
My copy may lead to confusion; but there is no false-
hood in that either. My copy can be false only if it denotes
or connotes that it came from another source. If there is no
passing off, copying does not violate Section 43(a).2 00 In the
generic pill case, Judge Friendly's characteristically penetrat-
ing dissection of Sears-Compco and Section 43(a) pointed out
that the Supreme Court was not attempting to address Sec-
tion 43(a) (which anyway in 1964 was still only adolescent).
195. Chevron Chemical Co. v. Voluntary Purchasing Groups, 659 F.2d 695,
701 (5th Cir. 1981).
196. See 2 J.T. MCCARTHY, supra note 123, at 345, identifying Federal-Mogul-
Bower Bearings, Inc. v. Azoff, 313 F.2d 405 (6th Cir. 1963) as signalling "a whole
new dimension of § 43(a)."
197. L'Aiglon Apparel, Inc. v. Lana Lobell, Inc., 214 F.2d 649 (3d Cir. 1954).
198. For contrasting views of the proper scope of Section 43(a), compare
Germain, Unfair Trade Practices Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act; You've Come a
Long Way, Baby-Too Far, Maybe?, 49 IND. L. REV. 84 (1973) with Bauer, supra note
194.
199. See Big 0 Tire Dealers, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 561 F.2d
1365 (10th Cir. 1977), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 1052 (1978); Truck Equipment Ser-
vice Co. (TESCO) v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 861 (1976); LAiglon, 214 F.2d 649 (3d Cir. 1954).
200. I do not believe that any of the cases disavow this proposition; they just
get a little careless about adhering to it and occasionally flirt with the siren songs
of misappropriation. See, e.g., TESCO, 536 F.2d at 1213.
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"The Court, it can be strongly argued, had no need to be
concerned with marking out the boundaries of a federal tort
over which it had complete control and which Congress
could contract if the courts were pressing it further than that
body desired." 20 1 As we have seen, the Supreme Court muf-
fed an opportunity to construe Section 43(a) in the same liti-
gation 20 2; and it is rather unrealistic to expect Congress to
concern itself with fine-tuning that statute.
But Sears-Compco still offers vital guidance to the proper
application of Section 43(a). In SearsJustice Black wrote for
a unanimous Court:
Doubtless a State may, in appropriate circumstances, re-
quire that goods, whether patented or unpatented, be la-
beled or that other precautionary steps be taken to
prevent customers from being misled as to the source,
just as it may protect businesses in the use of their trade-
marks, labels, or distinctive dress in the packaging of
goods so as to prevent others, by imitating such mark-
ings, from misleading purchasers as to the source of the
goods.203
Attention must be paid. At a minimum, in framing in-
junctions, more attention should be paid to the remedial po-
tential of requiring better labelling by the defendant.
Section 43(a) does not say, "Thou shalt not copy." It says,
"Thou shalt not use a false designation of origin." In sev-
eral of the cases we have looked at, a direction that the de-
fendant must clearly identify itself should have sufficed. 20 4
The plaintiff should also identify itself. A seller who does
not adopt and affix a trademark, who in fact relies solely on
the appearance of her goods for source identification (the
letter tray in Rogers 205 and the Mighty 0J 20 6 spring to mind)
201. Ives Laboratories, Inc. v. Darby Drug Co., 601 F.2d 631, 642 (2d Cir.
1979) (affirming denial of preliminary injunction).
202. Inwood Laboratories v. Ives Laboratories, 456 U.S. 844 (1982).
203. 376 U.S. at 232.
204. See American Greetings Corp. v. Dan-Dee Imports, Inc., 807 F.2d 1136
(3d Cir. 1986); Morex S.P.A. v. Design Instutute America, 779 F.2d 799 (2d Cir.
1985); W.T. Rogers Co. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334 (7th Cir. 1985); LeSportsac, Inc.
v. K-Mart Corp., 754 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1985); Metro Kane Imports, Ltd. v.
Rowoco, Inc., 618 F. Supp. 273 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). Such curative requirements
would not preclude recovery of damages for earlier confusion.
205. 778 F.2d 334.
206. Metro Kane, 618 F.Supp. 273. See also Bose Corp. v. Linear Design Labs.
Inc., 467 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1972) (affirming denial of preliminary injunction).
Bose deliberately marketed its pentagonal speakers "without affixing its name,
1987] 1385
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does not have a distinctive identifier, and understandably
has trouble establishing secondary meaning-in the making,
or any other kind.
IV. FREE RIDERS AND LEVEL PLAYING FIELDS 2° 7
The whole body of law that we have looked at is two-
faced. One face recognizes that homo sapiens thrive on imita-
tion and so does the economy. The other looks with distaste
on copiers. They reap where they have not sown;208 they
compete unfairly. Behind the distaste is a more rational con-
cern that easy copying discourages originality. Judge
Sloviter wisely wrote in the Keene case, "As our ambience be-
comes more mechanized and banal, it would be unfortunate
if we were to discourage use of a spark of originality which
could transform an ordinary product into one of grace." 209
Many of the decisions, notably Judge Posner's in Rogers v.
Keene, 210 try to strike a balance between competitive copying
and untamed free-riding. His view of effective competition
recognizes that free-riding copiers may diminish investment
in socially useful innovation. If the product is one that re-
quires substantial investment, whether of capital or of talent,
the investment may not be made if the prospect of profit,
cloudy at best, is made more risky by the likelihood that
competitors will enter, drive prices down to their marginal
costs, and leave the originator with no return on her sunk
costs, and with no hope of profits that will balance the risk of
failure.2 1'
relying on the uniqueness of product design [as] a common law trademark." Id. at
308. Defendant's copy bore its name on the speaker, the carton, and in all adver-
tising. This, the court said, "goes far to eliminate confusion of origin," both with
respect to § 43(a) and state law. Id. at 309-10.
207. This section is taken with very little change from Brown, Copyright and its
Upstart Cousins: Privacy, Publicity, Unfair Competition, 33 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 301,
313-20 (1986). Parts of the preceding section are also traceable to that lecture,
which was written and delivered at the invitation of the Copyright Society of the
U.S.A., as the 16th Donald C. Brace Memorial Lecture, May 1, 1986.
208. Cf. B. KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 2 (1967): "[I]f man has
any 'natural' rights, not the least must be a right to imitate his fellows, and thus to
reap where he has not sown."
209. Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Industries, 653 F.2d 822, 825 (3d Cir. 1981).
210. 778 F.2d 334 (7th Cir. 1985).
211. Consider these sagacious observations by an experienced practitioner,
Lloyd McAulay, Esq., of the New York City bar, quoted with his permission from a
letter of May 21, 1986:
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What I have just said is nothing more than a restate-
ment of the mainstream justification of the constitutional
provision for copyrights and patents. The constitutionally
favored device for promoting investment in "science and
useful arts" is a statutory monopoly of limited duration. 21 2
But suppose that there is no statutory monopoly. Are there
then other circumstances in which a court may address the
free-rider phenomenon in relatively dispassionate economic
terms?
The copyright laws themselves suggest one approach.
Our copyright law has qualified its straight-out monopoly
grant by creating compulsory licenses in certain markets, es-
pecially phonograph records and cable TV.21 3 In their
spheres, compulsory licenses leave the author with a right to
Large institutions have all sorts of de facto and de jure rights
which constitute partial monopolies. Access to financing, access to
markets, ownership of a productive plant, control of substantial
amounts of know how, the accretion of a skilled work force, public
reputation give the established institution enormous advantage over
a new entrant into a field. Often , the only edge that a new entrant
has over the established institution is the intellectual proprietary
[sic] right. The patent, the copyright, the trade secret and the novel
industrial design are what justify the investment in a new business.
If a new entrant establishes a new business, a new product line or a
new service and established competitors are free to copy, then the
new entrant is inhibited from starting.
Obviously there are other considerations to take into account.
A major if not the major consideration that cuts the other way relates
to product design and trademarks. In the case of a trademark or in
the case of the way in which a product looks, massive advertising
which is available to established institutions builds customer accept-
ance of a product based on the trademark or based on the way the
product looks. That advantage stems from financial muscle as op-
posed to innovation. It should not get the same degree of legal pre-
ferment as does other innovation. That is probably why the guiding
rule in the trademark law is not to protect the proprietor of the
trademark but rather to protect the customer from confusion. By
contrast, the guiding rule in patent and copyright law is to protect
the innovator on the assumption that providing such protection will
foster investment in innovation.
For the story of an innovative company that has succeeded although "giant
consumer-products companies trampled little Minnetonka's innovation with simi-
lar products of their own," see Greenhouse, Minnetonka's Struggle to Stay One Step
Ahead, N.Y. Times, Dec. 28, 1986, at F8 (novel but unprotected products included
liquid soap and toothpaste in a pump dispenser).
212. See Brown, Eligibility for Copyright Protection: A Search for Principled Standards,
70 MINN, L. REV. 579, 592 (1985).
213. See Note, The Socialization of Copyright: The Increased Use of Compulsoy Licenses,
4 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 105 (1985).
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remuneration, not a right to exclude. They let their benefi-
ciaries have a ride, but not a free ride.
Return to the situation where an innovator has no statu-
tory rights and seeks judicial protection against free riders.
Assume that a court modestly accepts that it should not cre-
ate intellectual property rights that the legislature withholds.
Can it nevertheless try to create "a level playing field"? Per-
haps the court can decline to insulate the innovator from
competition, but will make his competitors contribute to the
development costs that he incurred. Then, with everyone
starting from about the same financial starting-blocks and
with a level playing field and with no free riders, the competi-
tive race will be to the swift.
One more familiar economic metaphor from the sport-
ing arena should be noted: the originator will have had a
head start. That is often the only advantage our system
grants to an originator and it is often enough. But a head
start confers an advantage confined to those who succeed
and thus is perceptible only by hindsight.
In principle, to diminish free-riding while encouraging
competition would be manifestly preferable tounlegislated
monopolies which are the usual outcome of a successful
claim against unprivileged copying. But there are difficulties
in framing and administering such a proposal, and the trans-
action costs may be excessive.
A vivid illustration is provided by a 1985 Second Circuit
decision, where Judge Winter, for the panel, proposed a
cost-equalizing arrangement.2 1 4 The plaintiff, Legi-Tech,
produced an electronic database of pending bills in state leg-
islatures and other related materials, such as reports of rele-
vant campaign contributions. New York's Legislative Bill
Drafting Commission had developed a similar computerized
database consisting chiefly of texts of all legislation intro-
duced in the New York legislature. The Commission has
uniquely prompt access to new bills. Its service, available by
subscription to the public, or that part of the public with ap-
propriate computer terminals, would of course be of great
value to Legi-Tech. But the Commission, viewing Legi-Tech
as a deadly competitor, denied Legi-Tech access to its Legis-
lative Reference Service and the legislature backed it up.
214. Legi-Tech, Inc. v. Keiper, 766 F.2d 728 (2d Cir. 1985).
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Legi-Tech sought relief from the federal courts. It got none
in the trial court from Judge Minor (now raised to the Court
of Appeals). He was deaf to the first amendment arguments
of Legi-Tech and protective of what he called the state's
"natural monopoly on computer supplied legislative
information." 21
5
For the Court of Appeals, Judge Winter declared that,
"There is nothing natural about the alleged monopoly in the
instant case .... The evils inherent in allowing government
to create a monopoly over the dissemination of public infor-
mation in any form seem too obvious to require extended
discussion." 2 16 But the court was troubled by the Commis-
sion's fears that Legi-Tech could undercut the Commission's
rate and make its service uneconomical.
Legi-Tech is not a copyright case. The information in
the Commission's database was safeguarded only by an elec-
tronic barrier. Judge Winter was willing to make the Com-
mission lower that barrier. Noting an assurance from Legi-
Tech that it did not expect to subscribe at the same rates
that ordinary users pay, he wrote:
To the extent that concession means that Legi-Tech
is willing to pay the true cost to Legislative Reference
Service(LRS) of its subscription, namely the revenue LRS
will lose as a consequence of Legi-Tech's retransmission
of LRS materials, we believe that LRS may not decline to
offer subscription rights to Legi-Tech. 217
The Commission grumbled about the difficulty of arriv-
ing at a rate; but the court, observing the ubiquity of rate-
setting "in far more complex situations than this," thought
that cooperation between the parties would lead to "a rea-
sonable price." 21 8
"A reasonable price"-what could be more reasonable?
Setting "reasonable royalties" is not unknown in patent liti-
gation.219 But the parties in this case had great difficulty in
215. Legi-Tech, Inc. v. Keiper, 601 F. Supp. 371, 381 (1984).
216. 766 F.2d at 733.
217. Id. at 736.
218. Id.
219. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1982) (damages for infringement: "in no event
less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the in-
fringer."). Reasonable royalties are sometimes proposed in difficult copyright
problems. See, e.g., Clemmons, Author v. Parodist: Striking a Compromise, 46 OHIo ST.
L.J. 3 (1985).
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arriving at a rate,220 and the proper measure of such a price
is far from clear.
Consider the implications of the court's prescription,
that Legi-Tech should pay for its access "the revenue LRS
will lose as a consequence of Legi-Tech's retransmission of
LRS materials." That plunges us into considerations of aver-
age versus marginal costs and revenues, prefaced by cost al-
locations which may be complicated. The Commission's
costs must in large part be those incurred in carrying out its
public functions. As a public entity, how are its prices ar-
rived at? It has had a monopoly on the business of rapid
access to new bills; do its prices reflect that advantage?
Next, what happens when other disseminators of legislative
information come along? The court did not have to, and did
not, reach beyond this case to describe the pricing process if
additional electronic publishers want to buy LRS's informa-
tion and repackage it in a variety of forms.
Perhaps this situation, with its mix of public and private
interests, is too slippery to grasp for a first cast at extracting
some compensation from free-riders. Let us return to our
more familiar setting, the copying of designs of useful ob-
jects. Again, assume that no copyright or design patent pro-
tection is available. There may be no copyright or patent
because the object hasn't enough originality, like the Uncle
Sam bank in Batlin v. Snyder,22 ' or because the object is con-
sidered primarily useful, like the store-window mannequins
in Barnhart.222
The originator in cases like this has a litany of griev-
ances. First, he doesn't want his object ripped off at all. But
if he can't stop imitators, he's still understandably peeved if
a competitor shaves costs by using a copy of his object from
which to make a mold. Worse, the competitor may go to the
fabricator, somewhere in the outer reaches of Taiwan, and
get a few thousand dozens run off from the very mold for
which the first fellow paid. This may look like a short free
ride; but the free-rider's cost advantage-no designer fees,
220. An interim rate permitted Legi-Tech to embark on limited licensing (in-
formation from Terence Leahy, Esq., of counsel for Legi-Tech).
221. L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 857 (1976).
222. Barnhart, Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1985).
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no mold expense-may take all the fun and most of the
profit out of the mannequin business.
This kind of grievance has festered enough to erupt into
legislation in three states that thus far have enacted "plug
mold" statutes. 223 The name comes from the California pro-
totype, which is clumsily drafted. It speaks of using the
"original manufactured item ... as a plug for the making of
the mold ... ,"224 Here are the key sections of the Michigan
version, which does not assume that everyone knows what a
"plug" is. It reads as follows:
Sec. 1. As used in this act, "direct molding process"
means any manufacturing process in which an original
product is used as a pattern for making a mold which
mold is used to manufacture copies of that product.
Sec. 2. (1) A person shall not manufacture for the
purpose of sale, by use of a direct molding process, a
product manufactured by another person without the
permission of that other person.225
These statutes do not seem to address the situation in
which the copier has made use of another person's actual
mold.
In a recent case that came to the Federal Circuit from
California, Judge Rich determined what the statute does
mean.2 2 6 He deduced that you can't directly use another's
223. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17300 (Deering Supp. 1987); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 445.621-4 (West Supp. 1987); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-50-111 (1984)
(same as California).
I have no information about the legislative history of the Michigan or Tennes-
see statutes. The California statute was apparently introduced at the behest of a
manufacturer of "spas," who represented that an original mold cost from $20,000
to $40,000. If one of the products was then used to make another mold-the
trade jargon for this is "splashing"-it would cost these copiers only $1-3,000,
and very little time. California Legislative Counsel suggested that substantial
mold cost difference would also obtain for boats. After the bill was passed, the
Patent Law Association of San Francisco asked Gov. Brown to veto it, on the
ground that it probably was prempted by 17 U.S.C. § 301 and by Sears-Compco.
The Association's President said, "I believe it passed unnoticed by any of the in-
tellectual property attorney associations in the State." (These gleanings are from
materials kindly supplied me by Gary A. Clark, Esq. and William C. Schubert,
Esq., counsel in Interpart Corp. v. Italia, 777 F.2d 678 (Fed. Cir. 1985). A set of
these materials is on file in the offices of UCLA Law Review).
224. CAL. Bus & PROF. CODE § 17300 (Deering Supp. 1987).
225. MIcH. COMP LAws ANN. §§ 445.621, 445.622 (West Supp. 1987).
226. Interpart Corp. v. Italia, 777 F.2d 678 (Fed. Cir. 1985)(rear-view mirror).
The only other reported case applying the Plug Mold statutes appears to be Metro
Kane Imports, Ltd. v. Rowoco, Inc., 618 F. Supp. 273 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), which,
with little discussion, based its preliminary injunction in part on a California state
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object to make a mold. You have to model the object itself.
Then you can make a mold and compete-or rip off, de-
pending on one's point of view-without violating the "plug
mold" statute.
Judge Rich explained that the statutes are intended to
protect an originator against "unscrupulous" 227 competi-
tors-by which he means imitators. But if it is "unscrupu-
lous" to buy a rear-view mirror and make a mold directly
from it, is it any less unscrupulous to hire somebody to
handcraft a copy and then make a mold? That is what the
defendant did in the mannequin case.2 28 Perhaps there is no
difference in commercial morality. But there is in law. As so
often happens, the design patent on the rear-view mirror
was held invalid. It wasn't inventive. There was no copy-
right. Therefore, the mirror was in the public domain-un-
less the "plug mold" statute, state unfair competition law, or
Section 43(a) had been violated. The court, after a quick
survey of Ninth Circuit law, correctly held that there was no
federal or state unfair competition breach because the de-
fendant clearly indicated the source of its mirrors, "both on
the box and on the mirrors themselves." 229 This is a rare
instance of proper attention to the teaching of Sears-Compco.
Judge Rich briefly considered whether Sears-Compco pre-
empted the plug mold statute and found, contrary to the
trial court, no "clash" with patent law.230 California law for-
court injunction against Rowoco, established by an affidavit. Id. at 277. Interpart
remanded the plug mold issue for trial; among other factual problems was the
comprehensibility of a document that had been translated from Chinese to Japa-
nese and then to English. 777 F.2d at 686. The case was then settled.
227. 777 F.2d at 685.
228. That defendant in Barnhart, Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411 (2d
Cir. 1985), made its own mold is apparent from examination of the two sets of
mannequins, which clearly show minor variations (inspection courtesy of Jordan
B. Bierman, Esq., counsel for defendant).
229. 777 F.2d at 683-84. This part of the opinion discusses Ninth Circuit
precedents on functionality and comes to rest on Tveter v. AB Turn-O-Matic, 633
F.2d 831, 839 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 911 (1981), which held that
labelling is the key and actually cites Sears-Compco.
230. Judge Rich wrote for the court: "The California law does not 'clash' with
the federal patent law... we see nothing in the federal patent statutes that con-
flicts with California's desire to prevent a particular type of competition which it
considers unfair." 777 F.2d at 685. The problem may be otherwise stated: Can
California proscribe a technique of copying? The answer is not clear.
Interpart dealt with the Lanham Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125a (West 1982)
and California unfair competition law, not with copyright, and therefore did not
discuss the reach of preemption of state law by 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1976). The argu-
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bade only one mode of copying, by direct molding from the
object. This, Judge Rich said, California could condemn as
unfair competition. Whether there had in fact been a "plug
mold" violation was a murky question that required a
remand.
To return to the proposition that free-rider imitators
should somehow pay their way. The "plug mold" laws at-
tempt to impose costs on the imitator that diminish his ad-
vantage over the originator. But their method is clumsy and
wasteful of resources. They say, "You can copy this object;
but you have to repeat some of the expense that the origina-
tor bore. You have to do the work of making a duplicate
original model, just as he did."
That is essentially what the copyright cases say about
directories and other compilations. When the law uncom-
fortably draws these sweat works into the bosom of copy-
right, it doesn't banish competition. It says, "Go trudge the
streets yourself and you too can then publish a directory."
This sounds virtuous and avoids the free-ride; but with the
waste of a lot of time and shoe-leather. 23'
At least the privilege to go do it yourself makes it possi-
ble for more than one directory to exist; the second one may
be better than the first. There is another analogy in the new
Chip Mask Act, with its extraordinary reverse engineering
privilege. 232 Under that new law, a competitor, at considera-
ble expense, can take apart the protected computer chip and
borrow extensively from what he finds, provided his result
improves on the first chip. 233
The "plug mold" and the Chip Mask statutes, and the
state of the copyright law as it relates to directories and com-
pilations all draw back from the full sweep of protection
against copying that designers seek and often obtain.
ment would run that Congress, having excluded the shape of useful objects from
copyright, while providing for them in design patent, ratified the position of Sears-
Compco that the states could not prevent copying of articles unprotected by copy-
right or patent. The Plug Mold law operates as an impediment (though not a
barrier) to copying. On the shortcomings of § 301, see Abrams, supra note 178.
231. See generally Gorman, Fact or Fancy? The Implications for Copyright, 29 J.
COPYRIGHT Soc'y 560 (1982).
232. Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, ch. 9, 98 Stat. 3347 (1984)
(to be codified at 17 U.S.C. § 901).
233. See Raskind, Reverse Engineering, Unfair Competition, and Fair Use, 70 MINN. L.
REV. 385 (1985).
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In summary, there are several possible solutions beyond
copyright and design patent to the kind of free-riding that
sometimes arouses moral indignation and arguably saps the
initiative of innovators. The first and most common is the
acceptance of judge-made monopolies, i.e., injunctions
against imitation, in the name of unfair competition. We
have seen in Part III that these monopolies are often accom-
plished by stretching beyond recognition both the state law
of trade symbols as limited by Sears-Compco, and the federal
law of unfair competition that Congress set loose in Section
43(a).
A second way to rein in free riders is by cost sharing,
which calls to mind compulsory licensing in copyright law.
We looked at the intriguing Legi-Tech case, where Judge Win-
ter proposed a cost-sharing remedy in order to balance the
important access claims of the plaintiff against the state's
fear that it would not recoup its compilation costs.
Cost sharing is, I think, compatible with economic effi-
ciency and with notions of fairness that should be recog-
nized. But it will not be easy to delineate the correct
contours of such a remedy. Even if we were willing to settle
for rough justice, the problem may become too complicated
for practical administration, as successive imitators come
along and market shares shift. And of course it will not sat-
isfy monopoly seekers.
A third device is compulsory reinvestment. This is a
fancy label for making the imitator do the spadework over
again. It also faintly echoes the copyright doctrine that al-
lows independent creation of the same work. 23 4 The direc-
tory and chip mask analogies recognize less than total rights
in the originator in the expectation that the imitator may
come up with a better version. But the simple restriction of
the "plug mold" laws is nothing more than an inefficient
roadblock; it raises costs for imitators and does nothing for
consumers if all the market wants is the exact same thing
only cheaper.
The fourth and hardest thing is to do nothing. Let the
free riders ride. This is often a good thing; for consumers,
such a good thing (so long as they are not misled) that I will
234. M. NIMMER, supra note 4, at § 2.01[A].
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not take space to defend it. It does require judges to be deaf
to complaints that "It isn't fair."
Fifth is the notion that something must be done to nur-
ture these interests at the outer edge of copyright and unfair
competition law; a little statutory monopoly may not be so
bad. In the last section of this overview, I will review a famil-
iar proposal for such a statute.
V. TIME FOR A DESIGN PROTECTION STATUTE?
There have been sporadic attempts to enact a federal
design protection statute ever since 1914.235 Beginning in
1957, a bill has been introduced in probably every Congress,
in a form closely resembling the current model. 236 The bill
has the distinction of halving passed the Senate five times,
three standing alone and twice as Title II of the general
copyright revision. 237 But when enactment of the copyright
revision was imminent in 1976, the House Committee "de-
leted" Title II. It did so on three grounds: first, that it was
not really a copyright law; second, that decision had not
been taken as to what agency should administer it (the cur-
rent bills provide that the Copyright Office will); and third,
that protection of typeface designs was still an open ques-
tion. The whole subject was remitted to the next Con-
gress;23 8 and there it has sat. The common supposition has
been that Congressman Kastenmeier, the longtime chairman
of the House Judiciary Subcommittee, lacked interest.23 9
But observers of this quiet corner of the law became
alert when the Chairman dropped a resounding footnote. In.
the course of a scholarly discussion of the parsimonious
principles that should govern sui generis legislation related to
copyright, he observed that the chip mask law had breached
a wall that had stood against such tailor-made amendments,
and that "[i]t now might be easier for protection of indus-
235. See Reichman, Domestic & Foreign, supra note 54, at 1188-90.
236. In the 100th Congress, it is H.R. 379, introduced by Congressman Moor-
head,Jan. 6, 1987. In the Senate, S. 791, introduced by Senator DeConcini, Mar.
17, 1987.
237. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 55, 49-50 (1976).
238. Id. at 50.
239. Reichman, Domestic & Foreign, supra note 54, at 1262 n.644.
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trial designs of useful objects to follow, bearing in mind the
dangers of false analogies."
240
With due respect for the 1976 putdown of the Design
Protection bill as "not truly ... copyright protection," it sets
up a right that is acquired like copyright, administered like
copyright, and enforced like copyright.
Until 1985, the bill had emphasized that it was for the
"Protection of Ornamental Designs of Useful Articles" (that
was its title).24' The right was conferred upon "the author
or other proprietor of an original ornamental design of a
useful article." 24 2 In the 1985248 and 1987 versions, a subtle
and baleful change of language has occurred. The title is
now "Protection of Industrial Designs of Useful Articles."
"Ornamental" is also dropped from the statement of the
right; it is now available for the "original design of a useful
article, which design is intended to make the article attrac-
tive or distinct in appearance to the purchasing or using pub-
lic .... "244 "Ornamental" has effectively disappeared. 245 I
will shortly criticize this shift, which is also reflected in the
language of Chairman Kastenmeier's footnote.
The bill excludes "staple or commonplace" designs.
2 46
Another important exclusion, which echoes the first Copy-
right Office regulation that reined in Mazer v. Stein, bars pro-
240. Kastenmeier & Remington, The Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984: A
Swamp or Firm Ground?, 70 MINN. L. REV. 417, 468-69 n.214 (1985).
241. See H.R. REP. No. 2985, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983)(emphasis added).
242. H.R. REP. No. 379, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1001(a) (1987) (the bill is
proposed as Chapter 10 of U.S.C. Title 17, Copyrights; thus the "10" prefix to
each section number).
243. H.R. REP. No. 9900, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
244. H.R. REP. No. 379, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1001(a) (1987) (emphasis
supplied).
245. It still turns up in the statement of purpose of the House version ("to
provide for protection of ornamental designs of useful articles"). There are also
"vestigial references" in § 1027 and § 1028. The Industrial Innovation and Technol-
ogy Act: Hearings on S. 791 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks, of
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (March 26, 1987) (State-
ment of Ralph Oman, Register of Copyrights) (this statement is a valuable analysis
of the current bill and its shortcomings) [hereinafter Statement of Ralph Oman].
"Original" has the same meaning as in copyright law: "A design is 'original' if
it is the independent creation of an author who did not copy it from another
source." Id. at § 1003(b)(3). Contrast the enactment clause of S. 791, which
states that "This Act may be cited as the 'Industrial Innovation and Technology
Act of 1987.' " The bill may encourage innovation, but it assuredly does not re-
quire it.
246. Id. at § 1002(b).
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tection of a design "dictated solely by a utilitarian function
of the article that embodies it."247 Another exclusion re-
peats verbatim pivotal Section 102(b) of the Copyright Act.
It denies protection for "any idea, procedure, process, sys-
tem, method of operation, concept, principle, or discov-
ery. '"248 Still another excludes "three-dimensional features
of apparel." 249 This exclusion has no basis in any discerni-
ble principle. It was added in 1966 to help still the vocifer-
ous opposition of retailers to the bill.250 The modes of
securing protection are reminiscent of the 1909 Copyright
Act. Either publication with notice (a D in a circle) or regis-
tration, set the ten-year duration going. 25'
Omission of the statutory notice is not divestive; but it
does deprive one of money remedies against a copier who
has not been given written warning.2 52
On the other hand, registration in the Copyright Office
within a year after the design is made public is essential.2 53
All the Office does is "determine whether or not the applica-
tion relates to a design which on its face appears to be sub-
ject to protection under this chapter." 254 There is no search
of prior art, no judgment about obviousness. To counteract
this easy acquisition, there is a novel administrative opportu-
nity for anyone injured to seek to have a registration can-
celled. 255 This provision has a counterpart in the Trademark
Act256 but not in copyright.
Nothing is said about judicial review of denials of regis-
tration or of cancellation; but "[i]n any action involving a
design for which protection is sought under this chapter,"
the court may order registration or cancellation. 257
247. Id. at § 1002(d).
248. Id. at § 10 0 2 (g).
249. Id. at § 1002(e).
250. See Legislative and Administrative Developments, 13 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y
402-03 (1966).
251. H.R. REP. No. 379, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1006 (1987).
252. Id. at § 1007.
253. Id. at § 1009(a).
254. Id. at § 1012(a).
255. Id. at § 1012(c).
256. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1063 (West Supp. 1987)(opposition to registration); id. at
§ 1064 (cancellation of registration).
257. H.R. REP. No. 379, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1023 (1987).
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Copying is infringement. 258 Remedies are akin to those
of copyright: injunction, 259 damages, 260 profits, 26 1 and con-
fiscation of infringing copies. 262 Arbitration, generally su-
pervised by the Register of Copyrights, is encouraged.2 63
Rights under the patent law are not affected, except that
grant of a design patent ends registered design protec-
tion. 264 The subsistence of copyright is not affected
either.2 65 Common law rights in an unregistered design
are unaffected, and, in a provision that I shall argue needs
narrowing, the law does not annul or limit "any trademark
rights or right to be protected against unfair
competition."
266
These are the highlights of thirty-five sections and
twenty-eight pages of large print. The ensemble seems to be
about 95% copyright. It differs from existing copyright law
notably by dispensing with any requirement of separability
of design and by accepting overall shape and appearance as
appropriate for protection. These characteristics of current
copyright law, however, are not among copyright's essen-
tials. As we have seen, they are at best an uneasy compro-
mise. The Design Protection statute also differs from
current copyright law in that, while fixation of the design on
or in an object is required, fixation does not suffice to invest
protection; publication and registration are necessary. 267
A major difference between the bill and copyright law is
the short duration-ten years.2 68 Until recently the pro-
posed term Was only five years, renewable for a second five-
year term.2 69 The very brief renewable term has the advan-
tage, as did the old two terms of copyright, of clearing out
258. Id. at § 1018(d).
259. Id. at § 1021.
260. Id. at § 1022(a).
261. Id. at § 1022(b).
262. Id. at § 1022(c).
263. Id. at § 1020(d).
264. Id. at § 1028.
265. Id. at § 1027.
266. Id. at § 1029(2).
267. See supra notes 252-53.
268. H.R. REP. No. 379, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1005(a) (1987).
269. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 22, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., Title II, § 205(a) (1975).
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designs that have had their day (or were stillborn); but noth-
ing else good can be said about a two-term scheme.
270
There are, in my view, four flaws in the present bill.
The first is that the transformations in coverage from "orna-
mental design" to "industrial design" is a fatal distortion of
the purpose that has infused this measure for many years.
Second, the exclusion of functional designs only when they
are "dictated solely by a utilitarian function" is too narrow.
Third, the preservation of unfair competition remedies is
too broad. Fourth, the cumulative provisions that permit co-
existence of design copyright are too generous.
The first and fatal flaw came to light when hearings were
held on the current version in March, 1987. The most vigor-
ous support for it came from original parts manufacturers.
It is quite clear that they expect to be able to register purely
utilitarian objects on the strength of design gimmicks that
make the article "distinct in appearance" even if it will never
be seen once it is installed. Such an invisible article could
not qualify for a design patent even if it were novel and in-
ventive. Now a fuel injector nozzle would get ten years' pro-
tection from copying just because it was distinct from other
nozzles.
This is a bald piece of protectionism, aimed of course at
the Japanese and other competitors in the replacement parts
market. The Copyright Office has opposed it and suggested
a return to earlier language that will heal the battered spirit
of the measure. 271 If that is not accomplished, the bill
should be consigned to an auto parts junkyard.
270. For a sampling of problems that plague the renewal arrangements of the
copyright law (still extant for copyrights in force before Jan. 1, 1978) see.17
U.S.C. § 304 (1976); see also R. BROWN & R. DENICOLA, CASES ON COPYRIGHT,
298-301 (4th ed. 1985).
271. See Statement of Ralph Oman, supra note 245. The recommended lan-
guage comes from the Willis bill of 1957, H.R. REP. No. 8873, 85th Cong., 1st
Sess., and would replace § 1001(a). It reads as follows (and should be used):.
(a) The author of an original ornamental design of a useful
article, or his legal representatives or assigns, may secure.the protec-
tion provided by this Act upon complying with and subject to the
provisions hereof.
An ornamental design of a useful article, hereinafter referred to
as "design," is a design of the article that includes features of shape,
pattern, configuration, or ornamentation intended to give the article
an attractive, artistic, or distinctive appearance and not merely utili-
tarian or functional in purpose.
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The "solely .. .utilitarian" language perhaps comes
from Copyright Office regulations that attempted to close
the floodgates after Mazer v. Stein opened them to designs
intended for use on useful articles. 272 "Solely" will make it
easier for sellers of all manner of essentially mechanical de-
vices, automobile exhaust pipes for example, to assert that
the engineer-designer had made them a little bit "attractive
or distinct in appearance.-2 73
Is there a better place to draw a line that has to be
drawn? I would suggest that the old Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals, in passing on the allowability of design pat-
ents, had a workable test-still used-when it barred designs
that were primarily functional.274 This is a critical matter that
needs to be further explored in hearings and elsewhere. I
do not pretend to be sure what the motjuste will be. But I am
confident that "solely" is not it. Too much machinery and
too many operating functions will creep in.
I am also confident that the drafters have opened the
barn door to (genteel) horse thieves when they preserve
"any trademark rights or right to be protected against unfair
competition." If Part III of this essay tells us anything, it is
that unfair competition has become a pretty loose concept.
It is fair enough to say that the originator of either a
registered or unregistered design should be free to enforce
any regulated trademark rights, especially for registered
marks. But the unconfined reference to "unfair competi-
tion" opens too many doors. 275 In view of the leanings of
A leading proponent of the current version argues that the bill has always
protected a design that is "ornamental or distinct in appearance," and that distinc-
tiveness alone should suffice. See W.S. Thompson (Patent Counsel, Caterpillar,
Inc.), Comments on Ralph Oman Statement, May 12, 1987. This should come as
a surprise, not only to the surviving draftsman of the 1975 bill, Judge Giles S. Rich
of the Federal Court of Appeals (see his statement at the March 26, 1987 hearing),
but to anyone who has had a long acquaintance with the bill).
272. 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
273. H.R. REP. No. 379, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1001(a) (1987).
274. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
275. See supra note 185. When the statutory ten years have expired, will the
registered design fall into the public domain? That would be the normal expecta-
tion; but one can be certain that owners of a design with staying power are not
going to let it go quietly. The obvious gambit will be an assertion that the design
has acquired secondary meaning during its term and that it is non-functional. A
copier will be back in the courts on the same old issues and the pressures will be
just as intense as they are now in all other segments of intellectual property,
namely to seek refuge in the one segment that has no inevitable durational limits.
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some courts toward indulging misappropriation claims, one
can imagine a designer, after the ten-year term has expired,
trying to convince a court that the design shouldn't slip into
the public domain, and that a burst of copying is unfair com-
petition. One way to build a fence around unfair competi-
tion would be to substitute the clause that was meant to be
part of Section 301 of the Copyright Act 276 and say that
there is no annulment of "trademark rights, or rights against
deceptive trade practices such as passing off and false
representation."
I am arguing that a design protection law should have
some preemptive effect, even if the drafters recoil from in-
serting an explicitly preemptive section. If and when a de-
sign protection bill comes close to passage, we will once
again see the sorry spectacle of special interests clamoring
for more than the bill gives. If that something is only the
continued recognition of a design patent, no harm in that.
Design patents are supposed to reward a significant level of
creativity; and they are hard to get. The draft bill recognizes
this superiority when it provides that conferral of patent ter-
minates a registered design. If I were the lawgiver, design
patents themselves would be terminated (when existing ones
expire, of course). But that is not important; we can leave
Cinderella sitting by the ashes.
277
However-and this is the crux of the fourth flaw that I
see-it is an entirely different matter to allow full copyright
to continue to be available for designs that meet copyright
criteria. This the current bill does. In so doing it runs afoul
of three main arguments for comprehensive design legisla-
tion. Argument one asserts that large categories of deserv-
ing designs are now unprotected. Argument two is that
copyright is "inappropriate for the protection of such de-
See, e.g., In re DC Comics, Inc., 689 F.2d 1042 (C.C.P.A. 1982); Silverman v. CBS
Inc., 632 F. Supp. 1344 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (trademarks in Amos 'n' Andy characters
where copyright had expired). See also Hartnick, MickeV Aouse & Friends Are Alive
and Well but Not Living in the Public Domain, 196 N.Y.LJ. Oct. 10, 1986, at 5;
Brown, supra note 92, at 306 n.29. The recognition of trademark rights in some
designs after their copyrights expire is probably inevitable. If the statute does not
bolt the door against bald misappropriation relief, the pressure to open that door
also will distort the system.
276. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1982).
277. Cf. Reichman, Copyright Act, supra note 64, at 384, arguing that there is a
niche for "tough protection" of design patent along with the "soft protection" of
design copyright.
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signs. The term of protection is too long for the majority of
designs. The scope of copyright protection is too
broad ...." Thus the Senate Committee stated in endorsing
Title II in 1975.278 It might have added: copyrights are too
easy to get. Argument three should be: since copyright pro-
tection as it stands serves only in part the public interest in
encouraging the creation of pleasing designs, a scheme of
encouragement for all pleasing designs ought to suffice for
all designers.
In my ideal commonwealth the owner of an original de-
sign would have to take design registration or nothing.
279 I
cannot think of any persuasive reason, once a design statute
is in place, why designers of textile patterns, for example,
should get copyright, with its minimal level of required crea-
tivity, its casual notice and registration requirements, and its
extended duration, while other designers of modern lighting
fixtures, for example, must be able to show that their designs
are not "staple or commonplace," must register, and then
have only a ten-year term of protection (which I do believe is
quite long enough).
I would not of course expropriate existing copyrights.
But I would rewrite Section 113 of the Copyright Act and
278. S. REP. No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 161 (1975).
279. When serious attention came to be paid to enacting a design law in 1960,
the version then before the Congress would have had this effect. But interests
favored by copyright, notably Disney with its priceless stable of animated animals,
set up an outcry typified by Waldheim, Don't Maim Our Copyrights!, 7 BULL. COPY-
RIGHT Soc'v 160 (1960) (author a Disney lawyer); and over the next few years the
Copyright Office (which supported the design bill) made a slow retreat from the
principle of keeping the two realms separate. The complicated story can be
picked out of Reichman, Domestic and Foreign, supra note 54, at 1187, 1192, 1196,
1200.
Even if the unselective standards for copyright in artistic works, supposedly
mandated by Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903), and
Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951), require recog-
nition of cartoon figures and the like, copyright protection can and should be
confined to their use in media such as books, movies, and broadcasting, that do
not traffic in useful articles.
One more ambiguity that should be settled: Toys should be explicitly defined
as "useful articles." The unfair competition cases seem to accept that they are;
but the copyright cases are divided. Compare Gay Toys, Inc. v. Buddy L Corp., 703
F.2d 970 (6th Cir. 1983) (toys not useful articles) with Durham Indus. v. Tomy
Corp., 630 F.2d 905 (2d Cir. 1980) (games are useful articles). The position of
dolls is more deeply ambiguous. Do not dolls have a function "that is not merely
to portray the appearance of the article"? 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) (definition of
"useful article"). H.R. REP. No. 379, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1001(b)(1) (1987),
has the same definition of "useful article."
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the definition of "pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works" in
Section 101 so that design protection of useful articles
would be remitted entirely to the new law, which would be
chapter 10 of Title 17. I would preserve for copyright only
the 1949 extension of protection to "works of artistic crafts-
manship insofar as their form but not their mechanical or
utilitarian aspects are concerned.' '280
CONCLUSION
Through most of this article I have defended, indeed
extolled, the privilege to copy useful articles that are not
protected by patent or copyright. The chief obligation of
the copier, derived from the neglected teaching of the
Supreme Court in the Sears-Compco decisions, should be that
of labelling the copy as clearly as possible so as to minimize
confusion by consumers who have a preference for the first
source of the article. This is a traditional and rightful mis-
sion of the law of unfair competition. But, as that body of
law expands, due especially to overly generous readings of
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, some courts are banning
copiers outright, and are thus creating little monopolies that
have no statutory boundaries.
Part of the renewed impetus for this movement toward a
view of copying as unprivileged, as a kind of misappropria-
tion; probably comes from vague notions of fairness. These
notions have a rational economic foundation in the observa-
tion that the copier is a free rider, unburdened by the costs
that a design originator incurs in creating the design and in
creating a market for the product. The prospect of being
overtaken by the free rider, it seems reasonable to say, di-
minishes investment in innovation. After reviewing a variety
of devices for correcting this tilt against the innovator, I tilt,
though with no great enthusiasm, toward an encompassing
scheme of short-term exclusive rights in designs, so long as
the right does not capture the operation, the physical func-
tion, of the article.
280. There was only limited experience with this regulation before it was swal-
lowed up by the capacious maw ofMazer v. Stein in 1954. Consult Milch, Pr-otection
for Utilitarian Works of Art: The Design Patent Copyright Conundrum, 10 COLUM. J.L. &
ARTS 211 (1986) (extensive consideration of full copyright protection for works of
artistic craftsmanship combined with short-term design protection for useful
objects).
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What we now have is a too easy protection of some de-
signs through copyright. Other designs come into design
patent, which, as coldly viewed by the courts, is too hard.
The courts shield still other designs in unfair competition
cases, but erratically. A design protection statute occupying
almost all the field would make the field more level. Per-
haps, if it can be purged of its protectionist dross, its time
has come.
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